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Abstract 
This project focuses on the financial crisis and the change in crisis management within the Euro-
area from a nationally orientated to a community-orientated solution. This shift is investigated 
through a comprehensive policy analysis founded in a theoretical framework consisting of a 
combination of policy cycle theories and R.A.W Rhodes‟ policy network theory. Within this 
theoretical framework the project provides a policy analysis of the crisis management of the 
liquidity crisis in the Euro-area and the Greek excessive deficit crisis. On the basis of this, the 
project aims to clarify the relative power structure with the network of the Euro-area.  
We find that the change towards a more community oriented policy output was a product of the 
difference in type of crisis, the interdependency among Euro-area member states and most 
prominently the alteration of German interest. In so doing we aim at contributing to the already 
existing rationality and perception of the Euro-area crisis management during the financial crisis.  
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1. Introduction  
After several years with worldwide economic growth a financial crisis emerged in 2007, triggered 
by a shortfall of liquidity in the USA, resulting in a collapse of financial institutions and bailouts of 
banks by national governments. The crisis rapidly grew across borders and became a crisis on a 
global scale. In September 2007 the financial crisis forced the first national liquidity support to a 
bank in the European Union, when the fifth largest mortgage lender of the United Kingdom, 
Northern Rock, received financial support from the Bank of England (Northern Rock gets bank 
bailout v. BBC News). The crisis further developed in September 2008 where the bankruptcy of the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers sent shock waves through the entire financial system. The extent 
of the financial crisis and its severe consequences seriously showed its grim face in Europe, as the 
IMF warned that “Europe is facing its most severe economic downturn since World War II” (BBC, 
World Economic Forum 2009).  
The European banks were suffering from a liquidity crisis that forced national central banks and the 
European Central Bank to start injecting capital into banks to rebuild the lost confidence on the 
markets. Ireland led the way by creating the first national bank-package, making other nations 
follow their lead in order to not disturb the competitiveness of the Union‟s banking landscape. In 
the end, the situation made the Euro-area member states got together to agree upon a common 
direction for the management of the crisis (From crisis to recovery: the tools for the job v. The 
European Commission).  
The EU has become a huge economic power especially after the implementation of the single 
currency and the single market. Because of the monetary cooperation and the level of shared risks it 
implies the member states are very interdependent. Therefore, there will be economic cross-border 
issues affecting each other which makes this a shared crisis that invites for crisis management to 
happen on an EMU-level. The central institutions in the EU and the EMU, such as the Commission 
and ECB screamed for cooperation and unification in the search for a solution to the crisis. 
Therefore, it seems strange that the first approach to crisis management employed by the Euro-area 
nations in the beginning of the crisis was one creating a policy, which held such vague results, and 
guidelines that it encouraged nations to deal with the crisis within national borders. Though when 
the crisis changed form and Greece were suffering for extensive national debt the EMU came up 
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with what looks like a much more unified policy, composing an aid-package to Greece. What was 
the reason for the apparent change of approach concerning the crisis management in the EU?  
1.1. Problem area  
The main objective of this project will be centred on a policy analysis of how the Euro-area 
responded to the financial crisis. Within this question lie some basic assumptions about the EU, 
which we must first illustrate in order to proceed rightfully.  
The first assumption is that the European power position depends, if not only, then critically on the 
internal wellbeing of the Union – and in that perspective the Economic and Monetary Union1. For 
this reason, while focusing on the financial crisis the project will specifically analyse the internal 
dealings with the problems faced by EU member states, more directly the Euro-area. The second 
assumption is that the EU wishes to play a role in international agenda setting, and even though we 
do not attempt to analyse this role this assumption is fundamental to our project. The most recently 
passed treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon clarifies that the European Union strives at becoming a 
significant actor on the global stage; a goal that shall be achieved by handling external and internal 
threats as a unified actor as well as speaking with one voice in an increasingly globalised world. 
That same standpoint is emphasised in almost every speech held by European Officials, whether 
representing a single nation or the Union as a whole. The need for member states to stand united 
could not have been stressed more firmly or illustratively when the EU Council President gave a 
speech in Berlin on the 9th of November 2010 (EU President issues stark warning against 
nationalism v. EU observer), in which he stated:  
“This is no longer the monopoly of a few countries. In every member state, there are people who 
believe their country can survive alone in the globalised world," 
 
To which he added, 
 
"It is more than an illusion: it is a lie!"  
 
                                                 
1For elaborat ing arguments hereof see: Verdun, A. (2009).  
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Thus, there is substance in perceiving the EU as a global actor and assuming that EU strives for 
greater power internationally. Furthermore, there seems to be a clear perception among European 
technocrats and politicians that EU must act in a cooperative manner to reach its goals.  The third 
and final assumption is that an institution like the EU is best analysed during transformation in 
which the old constellations are tested and new ones forced into action. The financial crisis hitting 
Europe in the fall of 2008, leading to massive financial market distress, meant the first major testing 
of the vigour of the EMU and especially the cooperation within the Euro-area since its creation with 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. By analysing the crisis handling of the Euro-area during the 
financial crisis we wish to make some conclusions on the shape of the EU, in order to determine its 
institutional strength and its will to act as a union.  
The three basic assumptions mentioned above enable us to be more specific in formulating our 
research area which started with the idea that: if the Euro-area fails to react as a community to the 
financial crisis, it would fail as a successful community and could thereby seriously jeopardise the 
possibility of becoming a significant actor on the global stage. In the context of our research area  
we will, through policy analysis of two approaches to dealing with the financial crisis, determine 
the level of cooperation in the Euro-area.  
Looking at the crisis management of the financial crisis, the immediate response in the fall of 2008 
was to create national bank-packages. It seemed to be each country for itself and cooperation across 
national borders was at first limited. That the Euro-area members reacted in this manner supports 
the argument of Alex Coram, professor in economics at the Aberdeen business school who draws a 
parallel between the 1930s, 1970s and the initial European response to the financial crisis just after 
the burst in 2008:  
“Like the 1930s it is now every man for himself. It is easy to agree on solidarity in an economic 
upturn. But when in times of regression, it‟s every man for himself. That is how it was in 1930s as 
well in 1970s and the same applies today. History repeats itself.“  (Finanskrisen presser EU-
landene til at gå solo v. Information) 
 
The ability of the EU as an institution to prevent such responses is impeded by the fact that EU has 
a subordinate role, as crisis management is handled nationally in the Union. Nevertheless, with the 
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excessive debt crisis in Greece, EU proved to be a closer entity than first expected and wo rked 
together to create the aid package. 
The crisis management of the EU has been handled on different levels and we wish to investigate 
the EU and its supranational policy making institution, the Euro-area and the process towards how 
the two policies were created. The project will mainly be focused on the governance and policy 
processes performed by the EMU and its Euro-area members, in managing the financial crisis and 
its consequences.    
1.3 Our main research question  
To put it simply, the crisis handling can be divided into two; the first being the immediate reaction 
to the threat to national banking systems within Europe and the second being the Greek debt cris is 
and the collective actions taken by the EU, more specially the Euro-area. These two episodes 
demonstrate radically different approaches in crisis management and understanding these could 
very well turn out to be the key to understanding the interaction and political power plays among 
the organisations of the Euro-area. As we will give an explanation of these interactions as well as 
the apparent difference in the character of the management of the two crises our main research 
question is as follows:   
How and why did the Euro-area turn from a national perspective to a more unified solution in 
crisis management?  
To answer the questions of the changes in crisis management we will make a policy analysis of the 
two policies concerning the bank-packages and the aid-package to Greece, respectively. We will 
through empirical evidence analyse the two policies by determining the main actors in the network 
and their interactions. This will pave the way for an understanding of the reasons why the Euro-area 
members have seemingly gone from a nationalistic to a community approach to aiding Greece in 
solving its excessive deficit problems.  
Our research question is simply formulated and does not really carry a problem with it, but it give 
us the opportunity to work with a open methodology allowing us to use the empirical data which we 
find useful to describe the policy process and the interests of the organisations within the policy 
network and thereby on which terms the Euro-area crisis management happened. This will offer a 
better understanding of the EMU cooperation in general and thereby give the opportunity to take 
our conclusions to the next level, as we will attempt to do in Further discussions and perspectives.   
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2. Perceptions of the EMU  
2.1 Introduction  
This section will provide a description and discussion of the many perceptions of the Euro-area. 
This discussion will help us move on from the grand theory debates on integration. This section will 
provide an image of the EMU, the Euro-area in particular, in its international context. Furthermore, 
it provides an explanation of the institution‟s actions and norms when handling crisis. This gives us 
a better background for describing how our research can be seen as a contribution to the creation of 
alternative explanations of the interactions between the actors within the Euro-area and the differing 
responses to crisis represented by the two separate policy processes. 
2.2 Understanding the EMU    
The EMU was from its start seen as a way to smooth the political unification of the EU member-
states; its purpose was to deepen the European integration (Umbach and Wessels 2008: Euro at 10). 
However, that cannot be said to have been the sole cause of the establishment of the EMU as it was  
created for several reasons. These can be summed up in the following four main purposes, the first 
three being internal and one being an external motive (Dosenrode 2002: 2, Umbach and Wessels 
2008): Firstly, to further the integration process. Secondly, to create prosperity within the EU and 
completing the Internal Market. Thirdly, to secure the stability and integration of the European 
Union in its reunification after World War II. Finally, to create a bulwark against the negative 
consequences of globalisation and to work for the construction of a fair international economic 
system in order to challenge and outweigh the economic hegemony of the US: or said in another 
way, to strengthen the EC/EU as an international actor.  
Nevertheless, the promotion of integration within the European Union was the overall objective and 
economic and monetary cooperation was necessary to help this process; “If there is no monetary 
union, then there cannot be a political union and vice-versa”  (Dosenrode 2002: 2). As this 
suggests, the EMU was from its establishment considered vital to the European Union. The general 
cooperation would take a step closer to becoming a political union by the creation of the EMU and a 
single currency. For the EU the perceived significance of the EMU has not lessened as today the 
EMU and the Single Market is considered to be the most important institution which stresses the 
importance of the economic aspect today. The Euro is the second most important currency 
worldwide (only exceeded by the US dollar). It makes up one fifth of the of the world economy. 
Supporters of the EMU would stress that it has promoted the economic opportunities within the 
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Union by fostering trade, investments, employment, price stability etc. Moreover, the EMU 
cooperation provides safety and problem-solving capability in the face of economic shocks and 
helps avoiding economic instability (Dosenrode 2002: 19). The creation of the EMU provides the 
EU with a better opportunity to be a prominent global actor – in particular in the economic aspect 
when trying to compete with, instead of being dependent on, the USA. These ideas were some of 
the main reasons that triggered the creation of the EMU, and those ideas and perceptions about the 
EMU are still, pretty much, the ruling consensus, especially in regard to the economic opportunities 
and the development of the integration process.  
On the other hand, there are those who hold a quite different and less optimistic view. Some of the 
critiques the EMU often faces are; accusation of the EMU not being a completed project, unable to 
bring the necessary convergence among the unequal states in the euro-zone, and that the EMU is 
too complex and not flexible enough to do well as a single currency across borders. Therefore, there 
are challenges in the future which have to be coped with to keep – or regain – faith in the euro, and 
some improvements have to be made in order to cope with the challenge lying ahead in the form of 
the emerging economies such as China and India if market shares should not be lost. Giving the 
same conditions and demands to all member-states regardless of the diversity among them restricts 
the actions they can opt for in making long- lasting adjustments to get the economy back on track. 
Devaluation is, for instance, not possible because of the single currency. Especially in the time post 
crisis the risks connected to having the same currency in nations on different levels of development 
were visible and the critics believe that the EMU has made the Union more sensitive and vulnerable 
to economic turmoil (Marsh 2009: 3). In context to our project, it is exactly this kind of turmoil that 
we want to base our policy analysis on, so that we can reach an alternative explanation that can 
show whether the crisis caused a transformation of the Euro-area, from nationally to community 
orientated. Thereby the findings of this project can potentially challenge the view exemplified by 
Alex Coram cited in the problem area that cooperation between states in times of prosperity is one 
thing, while it is another matter entirely to uphold it during times of crisis. Then national interests 
will automatically become a more prominent factor in the policy-making of states comprising the 
cooperation. 
   
In an analysis of the Euro-area‟s responses to crisis perspectives taken from neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, respectively, can contribute to the understanding of the differences between 
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the initial reactions and the steps taken to mitigate the consequences of the Greek debt crisis. These 
two are the extremes within the realm of integration theory and between them there is a variety of 
approaches incorporating elements of both to different degrees. The two hold starkly contrasting 
views of which factors were paramount in the establishment of the EMU. The fundamental 
assumptions of these views can provide insights as to which actors are prominent in the political 
processes of EMU including those regarding crisis management.  
From a neofunctionalist perspective the EMU is perceived as a further development following the 
establishment of the European Monetary System and the Single European Act. It was a natural next 
step in the integration process driven forward by spill-over – referring to the notion that once it has 
been acknowledged that cooperation in one policy-area is advantageous for the participating states 
in order for these benefits to be reaped coordination in related areas is necessary. Neofunctionalism, 
principally set forth by Ernest Haas, emphasises the role of transnational interest groups and supra-
national institutions (Verdun 2002: 10) to which substantial autonomy is assigned. These 
transnational interest groups hold the ability to significantly influence outcomes and the assumption 
that, ultimately, the EMU can be seen as the sum of the member states is firmly rejected. In 
particular, the role of the Commission headed by Jacques Delors is highlighted (Verdun 2002: 17) 
acting as an ideational entrepreneur (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009: 71). The influence that 
the Commission is able to execute on the member states is derived from technical expertise. On the 
basis of that the Commission gains the ethos necessary to persuade national governments that the 
development of projects like the EMU should be steered in the direction they envision (Wylie 2002: 
80). In this vein a neofunctionalist assessment of relative political power and influence in the EMU 
would likewise emphasise the impact of a Commission advocating for unity and cohesion in the 
EU‟s efforts to mitigate the negative consequences of the financial crisis (The Commission 2008: A 
European Economic Recovery Plan, p. 5).  
By contrast, intergovernmentalist approaches rest on the basic assumption that states should be 
regarded as by far the most important actors (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009: 71). 
Consequently, international cooperation like that of the EMU always hinges on the states involved. 
Their actions are determined without exemption by their national interests and the EMU can only 
persist as long as being a member of it is perceived as being in accordance with these preferences. 
Crucial to the EMU is then interstate bargaining taking place in the fora of the Eurogroup, the 
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ECOFIN and the European Council. In such processes especially larger states such as Germany, 
France and the UK are held to be decisive.  
However, this project will not elaborate or discuss the integration processes of what measures and 
methods were or are employed in the EMU to further integration and unification. Thus, when using 
a policy network and policy cycle analysis we must be aware of the structure of the interactional 
integration between the policy networks and their power structures.    
It will not be an assessment or a vivid discussion of the grand theories, such as Amy Verdun‟s 
research on theorising European integration (Verdun, 2002) or Lloy Wylie‟s research on the EMU 
as a Neoliberal Construction (Wylie, 2002). Instead, we will through a policy analytical approach 
define the actions and mechanisms in the interactions within the policy network of the Euro-area 
that characterises the contextual behaviour of the Euro-area in handling the banking crisis and the 
Greek debt crisis, respectively. The intention of this project is to give a reasonable explanation of 
how the Euro-area took actions to save multiple European banks and later Greece from bankruptcy 
and through our policy analysis conclude on whether the Euro-area has characteristics of a 
community in unity or a community based on national preferences.  
Doing so involves assessments of which actors have exercised the greatest influence. But instead of 
determining this from an integration theory angle, when considering the complex web of actors in 
the EMU, we use Rhodes‟ policy network theory to analyse the power structures of these individual 
actors. The theoretical framework employed is thus comprised by theories that allow for nation-
states as well as supra-national institutions to be dominant. Either of the two types of actors can turn 
out to be the most influential in both a policy network and a policy process. In view of this our 
research project will be more likely to contribute with an explanation to the question, as addressed 
in the Journal of European Public Policy (Enderlein and Verdun 2009) of “whether this institutional 
structure [i.e. the EMU] will stay the same in the aftermath of the global financial crisis”.  
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3 Our scientific and methodological approach    
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter will encompass our methodological approach towards the research area. The 
methodological approach adopted in this project place utmost relevance to the research area, in 
determining what knowledge we can strive at gaining and how. In order to provide an adequate 
answer to our research question we will thus look deeply into the policy processes of the two crises 
management situations. In doing this we will apply the theory of the policy cycle, which is 
methodologically based on the work of Frank Fischer and the policy network theory by R.A.W. 
Rhodes. By including both theories in our analysis we will find ourselves able to investigate the 
changing character of the policy process within the Euro-area as well as the involved actors. We 
will elaborate this later on in the Operationalisation. For now we will focus on the methodological 
implications of applying these theories and first of all consider the ontological and epistemological 
perceptions of Fischer and Rhodes.    
3.2 Our science theoretical perception 
In our problem area we seek insights into the policy processes. We want to investigate both the 
internal causes and the framework so to gain a greater understanding of how and why the process 
happened like it did. Consequently we will highlight both the structure and the evolving process. 
This creates the need to include both the policy cycle with its focus on the evolving processes and 
its effect on the structure, and the policy network theory and its focus on the structure with its 
components and its effect on the process. We will use the two different policy theories to create a 
theoretical framework and through this theoretical framework, we will analyse and seek to explain 
the procedural mechanism that constitutes the actions of the participants and their effect on the 
policy outcome. Thus by including both theoretical approaches we can present a more profound 
description of the interactions between different kinds of actors, and their underlying mechanisms. 
By doing this it broadens our ontological research area, which gives us the epistemological 
opportunity to derive empirical data from the interactions between the actors imbedded in 
differentiated circumstances.     
Fischer (2010) argues that reality exist independent of our knowledge of it, so that even though 
knowledge is theory-dependent, theories cannot be predictive. Rhodes (1997: 80) also stress the 
importance of the subject; i.e. the system of governance within the Euro-area do exist outside our 
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observations. Furthermore, the reality of our research area is composed by actions and objects that 
generate effects which form policies and reform the area. These effects become measurable 
empirical data which we in our policy analysis of the two policy cases will outline so that we can 
answer our main research question. This constitutes our ontological point of departure. We will 
strive at uncovering the mechanism and streams working inside the policy process, but 
acknowledge at the same time that our findings depends on the theories used and the data found in 
the process and thus that a complete truth will not be achieved.  
In addition, Fischer (1998) argues that facts and the concept of truth are the relative products of 
certain communities. It is the practitioners, in the communities, that establish the ontological 
understanding of the community‟s own internal power structures, interests and claims of truth. The 
characteristics of the community are determined by the leading and most influential practitioners‟ 
researchers. This coincides well with Rhodes (1997: 193) and his understanding that facts are 
filtered through underlying values so that the truth will appear in the shape of the account made by 
the dominant practitioners. Competing perspectives can make different arguments about the same 
phenomena, though commonly the practitioners with most influential power determine whose 
rationality prevails. Accepting this argument has a double significance for our paper. On the one 
hand our findings will appear a bi-product of our values, but as we take part of other communities 
scientific and non-scientific, in which we are submitted to power structures, which means that our 
values and truths are thus neither isolated nor self created. To quote Rhodes (1997: 80); “…any 
political scientist ought to be explicit about the intelligent baggage that he or she brings to the 
choice of problem and the analysis of it”.  Our findings and consequently our drawn conclusions, 
which must be read in the light of the former, will at the same time contribute to the already 
constituted and differentiated rationality of the research area.  On the other hand the theories as well 
as the empirical materials used must be scrutinised in order to reveal the influence of value based  
perceptions. In consideration of the empirical data that we use in our project, we will look at it with 
critical eyes and try to scrutinise the empirical data for facts and truths that are not mere reflections 
of the authors‟ own personal meanings. We are  not to falsify any arguments made by the author but 
we are to consider its ontological logic and rationality, so that we do not use irregular or misguiding 
arguments. In respect to the theories, we will further expand our account of their point of departure 
in order to evaluate their theoretical systems on the basis of their ability to put forward plausible 
ontological projections (Kurki 2006: 210) and their combined explanatory power.  
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As Aristotle stresses, in any investigation one must always ask many multiple kinds of why-
questions (Kurki 2006: 209), in order to gain a more complete picture of the research subject. 
Therefore we will construct a methodological pluralistic approach (Fischer 1998), which will give 
us the best methodological setup to create a theoretical framework comprising as many aspects of 
the area as we can, while encompassing our critical view on it. Neither of our theories is predictive. 
They are more interested in analysing the social context in which empirical observations take place. 
Thus we will employ a descriptive approach which will provide us with the possibility to analyse 
the concrete actions affecting the policy process. In line with this, Rhodes (1997: 80) argue against 
implicit theorising though he acknowledge that value-free science is not possibly. And in 
accordance hereto we use the policy cycle theory and Rhodes policy network theory not to be 
predictive or value-orientated, but as a way to create a theoretical framework that, through its 
concepts and values, can help us analyse the complex political processes in the derivation of a 
policy.    
Drawing on Rhodes (1997: 81) our analysis will be constructed with inspiration from 
institutionalism with its dominating focus on institutions, while including a broader methodological 
pluralistic approach. Moreover we still take into account the constantly evolving processes that 
constitute our research area. This leads to a multi-methodical analysis including both intensive and 
extensive research methods. Intensive methods refer to qualitative and interpretive methods which 
will be used upon specific procedural actions, relations and episodes, being mechanisms that 
generate actions in the policy processes. In combination herewith we will apply an extensive 
method, resting upon statistical and quantitative data through which we will investigate the norms, 
facts and truth claims producing these actions (Sayer 2010). Though we place equal validity in the 
two types of methods and furthermore argue that they compliment each other, we will, due to our 
area of research be using the intensive method more frequently in our paper this is partly due to the 
hidden nature of the policy processes. As scripts of all meetings within the policy processes, rarely 
are available. Therefore, we must investigate the process by looking at the results, the relationships, 
the circumstances and thus through interpretation reveal the logic of the underlying mechanisms. 
This requires reflection and recognition of the sensitivity to the contextual circumstances in our 
problem area (Gadamer 1997). Viewing our data in a historical context is necessary, both according 
to Rhodes (1997: 83) who argues that empiric results always are dependent on their cultural 
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specificity and historical tradition and to Fischer (2010) because the subject of research is bound 
into is own rationality. Therefore, when we are to investigate the Euro-area and the policy processes 
we must do our best to portray and characterise how the Euro-area is structured, which implies how 
it sees itself. Thus combining the historical what-question with the scientific why-question. When 
we have portrayed the Euro-area, we will hold this understanding constant throughout the project, 
so that we are able to investigate our specific proposition; whether and possibly how the internal 
structure of the Euro-area have changed. 
As mentioned above it is the irregularity of the two problem solutions that interest us. When 
looking at this irregularity it is necessary to move on to the deeper level, analysing the underlying 
structures, forces and mechanisms existing at a certain point in time in the policy process of the 
Euro-area, and their influence on policy outcome (Jespersen 2009: 145-150). Which underlying 
structures and mechanisms in each of the two contexts could possibly have affected the outcomes of 
the two policy processes, and how? Rhodes (1997: 38) agrees with this line of thinking when 
emphasising the importance of the internal inter-actor relations that affect policy outcome. These 
structures are, however, not fixed but can change in the cause of time which underlines the 
importance of carrying out contextualised analysis. One must therefore analyse these elements of 
the field of research to be able to understand the continuously changing ontological reality. In our 
case, the changing ontological reality is represented by the policy outcome in each of the two 
incidents, which is then a relative result of the sum of the previously mentioned indicators. Through 
our analysis we strive at reaching a plausible and context-dependent conclusion regarding the 
empirically observed switch in crisis handling of the Euro-area. 
To sum up, understanding theory as an ordering framework, which permits observational data to be 
used for predicting and explaining empirical events (Sayer 2010: 5), we will in this project create 
such a theoretical framework on the basis of the policy cycle theory and the theory of policy 
networks. This will be done through the Operationalisation, from which we will conduct our policy 
analysis.  Where our policy analysis in the policy cycle will be the outer framework consisting of 
different stages to which we can place the many actions, processes, decisions and effects, Rhodes‟ 
policy network theory will be used as an inner theoretical framework to investigate the actions, 
processes and decisions taken by the different networks/actors.   
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3.3 Empirical scrutiny  
As we apply a policy analysis approach to the two separate cases of crisis management in the Euro-
area, we build our analysis and the following conclusion on an empirical puzzle which includes a 
complex net of empirical data with multiple backgrounds and origins. Consequently, we must pay 
much attention to the premises under which given data is produced (Ankersborg 2001). In other 
words, since this project includes a wide range of empirical data we must also consider the 
ontological aspects of the empirical data.   
As we use extensive amounts of empirical data produced within the European Union, we must be 
careful not to acknowledge these empirical findings as plain facts because the reports documented 
and formulated within the EU-based organisations constitute their own rationality. This becomes 
even more important because of the nature of a policy analysis, in which many of the decisions are 
spheres to which practically no access can be gained (Sidney 2007). Therefore, to add validity to the 
facts derived from EU papers we include various external documents and articles to support or 
oppose statements and documents produced within these organizations. When we aim at outlining 
processes and statements made outside of the public eye and when reviewing scientific documents 
or articles, we choose between these articles coming from various media so that we use only those 
that are titled „peer reviewed‟. In relation hereto when non-peer reviewed material is applied, we are 
aware of the risk of undocumented arguments and even inaccurate cause of relations. Therefore, if 
arguments build on such a source, they will be supported by additional empirical findings.  
We are not concerned with the exact economic aspects of the financial crisis, because this project 
seeks to scrutinize the crisis management in Euro-area and not the aspects of the financial crisis 
itself. Furthermore, actions taken by the members in the Euro-area on the national- level are not 
relevant either in answering the main research question. However, statements based on national 
preferences, by the members of the Euro-area, are of our interest.    
 
 
21 
 
4 Our policy theoretical frameworks 
4.1 Introduction   
Departing from our multi-methodological and scientific approach, we can commence in setting up 
our theoretical framework. This chapter will have three sections in which the first will be our 
perception of the policy as a concept and how we understand different policy processes, policy 
networks and their interactions. Secondly, we will operationalise and create the outer theoretical 
framework that consists of the policy analysis in the policy cycle. Thirdly, we will create the inner 
theoretical framework using Rhodes policy network theory. This creates a two dimensional 
theoretical framework which enables us to fully grasp the extensive complexity of the two policy 
processes in the crisis management of the EMU.  
4.2 Our perception of a policy and policy networks   
Throughout the paper our aim is to investigate the policy process, first the national bank-packages 
of 2008 and secondly the help-package to Greece in 2010. Thus, we wish to investigate both static 
and changing aspects concerning the two policy processes in order to expose and analyse the 
internal relationship among actors of the Euro-area2. Hence the policy process constitutes the upper 
most vital aspect in our analysis; therefore we find it necessary to clarify what we understand when 
mentioning and using the concept of a policy. Our understanding of a policy is simply defined to be 
whatever the Euro-area chooses to do or not to do; such actions (or inactions) can vary in form and 
substance ranging from a proclamation to law. In policy processes, policy decisions combine 
technical knowledge with complex social, economic and political realities (Fischer et al 2007), but 
is always under influence by the framework within which the policy process happens (Rhodes 1997: 
29). This is due to the assumption that governance is exercised by a wide range of actors, who come 
together in a quest to solve a specific problem (Rhodes, 1997: 7). 
4.3 The policy analysis in a policy cycle 
4.3.1 Introduction  
The main purpose with this section is to create a framework to place the complex web of processes 
into certain stages thereby providing us with a framework where we can analyse specific decisions 
                                                 
2 When talking about the Euro-area we do not think about the geographical area, but about the institutions and 
member states within EMU governance involved in the decision-making concerning the euro. 
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and actions made in the two separate policy cases. Furthermore, this will enable us to analyse how 
these actions and decisions form the policy outcome.    
4.3.2 The ideal policy cycle  
The policy process in its ideal type consists of five stages: agenda setting, policy formulation, 
decision-making, implementation and evaluation. These discrete stages do not follow a linear 
sequence and cannot be understood as stages going chronologically from one to five. On the other 
hand, the theory is more a behavioural kind of theory. Empirical studies of policy processes in 
institutions do not follow discrete stages of the ideal type. Therefore, the five stages, pointed out 
above, should be seen as an idealistic and rational policy process (Jann & Wegrich 2007).  
 
“Framing the political process as a continuous process of policy making allowed to 
asses the cumulative effects of the various actors, forces and institutions that interacts 
in the policy process and therefore shape its outcome(s)” (Jann & Wegrich 2007: 44).  
 
This makes it possible to analyse the input-side of the policy process where the various 
organisations in the network tries to influence and affect the policy-output. The entangled and 
messed characteristics of this model consist well with the reality of the messy and crowded spaces 
of politics and the development of policies. This also means that policies are se ldom very 
innovative because they mostly stem from already existing policies, and can mostly only change 
and supplement current policies (Jann & Wegrich 2007). In the following we present the policy 
cycle in its ideal type, although we recognize that it is a simplified perception of the policy process 
in reality, this simplification of the policy processes enables us to grasp the complexity of the actors 
and their interactions occurring in each stage.  
The five stages in the policy process are of differentiated importance to our analysis. Of particular 
importance are the agenda setting, policy formulation and decision-making stages. This is due to the 
fact that it is within these stages of the policy process that the actors influence the policy, and in 
accordance with our main research question these actors are of utmost importance. Therefore, in the 
case of our study of the two crisis and how they have affected the governance in the EMU, the 
theoretical understanding of the implementation stage such as eithe r a top-down, bottom-up or a 
hybrid approach (Pülzl & Treib 2007), is not relevant for our research project. It is the three 
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preceding stages that will show us whether, where and how EMU governance has changed 
character and why. We are not interested in how the EMU-policy to help Greece is implemented. 
Contrarily we are interested in the policy processes within the EMU and how the policy was made 
because it shows us the actions within the EMU. Additionally, we are not concerned with the 
effectiveness of the EMU and Greece to ensure that a policy is implemented correctly and how it is 
implemented. Neither are we interested in the output that the policy has on Greek economy, which 
means that the evaluation stage will also be left out of this project. This is graphically  illustrated on 
the next page.  
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The blue arrows represent the ideal process of the policy cycle (Jann & Wegrich 2007). We have 
faded the implementation and the evaluation stage because it is not relevant to our analysis. The 
blue background behind the policy formulation and decision-making stages illustrates the mixed 
nature of these stages (Sidney 2007). The Black arrows represent the fluidness of these stages and 
that these stages not always follow a chronological order (Jann & Wegrich 2007).  
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4.4 The stages of the policy cycle          
4.4.1 Agenda-setting phase  
The starting point for the policy cycle and the policy process is that problems and issues are being 
recognised and selected. Before a certain issue is recognised, it has to reach political awareness and 
the seriousness of this has to be acknowledged by institution officials3. Whoever seeks political 
awareness about a problem has to intermediate it through channels of mass intermediation. The 
need for mass intermediation rests on the idea that no single person possesses sufficient power to 
mobilize and initiate the political process necessary in creating a policy. In accordance with both 
Fischer (2007) and Rhodes (1997) only organisations are capable of getting the problem 
acknowledged as an agenda. The less influential organisations will usually coalesce in groups, so 
that the strength in numbers cannot be ignored (Birkland, 2007). Furthermore, Kingdon (1995) 
conceptualises how groups can change the agenda of institutions. He separates the agenda setting 
process by defining three independent and separate streams; the policy stream, the politics stream 
and the problem stream. When two or more of these streams interact, they form a window of  
opportunity, which opens to a possible change of agenda. The political stream occurs when there is 
either a broader range of public sentiment or a change of governance, and it is seen as the political 
motivation to change already existing policy or to implement new institutional governance. The 
problem stream occurs when there is a perception that a certain problem needs to be addressed 
through political action, such as policies. The policy stream is when agenda setting happens through 
the garbage can model when using already constituted policies to advocate the need for change 
(Kingdon 1995).  
Those organisations whose issues are recognised, is defined by Kingdom (1995) as policy 
entrepreneurs. They act to promote policy change more accurately by advocating for change by 
suggesting solutions in form of policies. The importance of the problem should then be emphasized 
and “sold” to the relevant institution officials to select it as a crucial problem which needs to be 
taken care of. This places the officials of the concerned institutions in the centre of the attention in 
studies of agenda setting, which then places the means and mechanism to get a problem recognised 
                                                 
3 Within the Euro-area this refers to a multi-level governance system. Through this report we are primarily 
investigating the policy process in the governance system of the Euro-area. We do, however, acknowledge that the 
agendas of each of the actors in our network are affected by the positions held by the participants in the nationally 
oriented networks.  
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and selected by the institution, in a very important subsequent stage of the agenda setting (Jann & 
Wegrich, 2007). As not all problems can receive the same amount of attention, the agenda setting 
phase is furthermore about selection; which problems are of utmost urgency to react against. Thus, 
it becomes highly relevant to analyse the mechanisms behind successfully getting a problem on the 
agenda. In our case, we must define which mechanisms were used to acknowledge the need for a 
policy on crisis management in the two crisis situations. In both situations, we must examine which 
mechanisms were used to raise the banking-crisis and the Greek-dept-crisis to such a degree that 
they became acknowledged on the EMU agenda.  
With reference to the above written, we will investigate empirical factors, which have had an 
impact on the agenda setting stage. First, we must research what caused the change in the streams to 
open a window of opportunity. Second, we must research why the urgency of the problem pointed 
out was recognised by the policy entrepreneurs. Third, who are the policy entrepreneurs4? Fourth 
and finally, what policy solutions are suggested to solve the problem?  
4.4.2 Formulation and decision-making stage  
This leads us to the next stage of the policy cycle, formulation. Though, a clear cut separation 
between formulation and decision making is mostly impossible (Jann & Wegrich 2007), because it 
is hard to say when the final formulation of a policy is accepted and the decision is made to take on 
the policy. We will still treat the two stages separately but describe them in the same section, 
because when the agreed formulation of a policy has been accepted the decision to take on the 
policy happens almost immediately. 
It is expected that fewer participants is to be involved in the policy formulation, than in the agenda 
setting process, furthermore a greater part of it will take place outside of the public eye thus within 
the EMU bureaucracies, in organisation offices, in legislative committees or in commission 
meetings, referred to as the realm of experts (Sidney 2007), hidden participants (Kingdon 1995) or 
technocrat and knowledge elites (Fischer 2000).   
The mere process of a policy in the formulation stage depends on the political system where the 
policy is processed. Furthermore, this political system also determine the final outcome of a policy, 
because an important aspect of the preliminary stages of the policy formulation is the notion that not 
                                                 
4 This point will be elaborated in the definition of the policy network of the Euro -area and the subsequent definition of 
the field of actors within it. 
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only do political players decide how a specific policy should be formulated, they also strongly 
influence the final outcome and shape of the policy (Jann & Wegrich 2007). The policy process 
enters the final decision-making stage when the formulated and accepted policy goes for a voting. 
When we say final it is because all the decisions which have preceded this have participated in 
formulating the precise policy. It is also in this sense that the decision-making stage is quit hard to 
differ from the formulation phase, because decisions are constantly made under the formulat ion 
phase to form the policy. We can thus conclude that the formulation phase is a pre-decision phase of 
the policymaking. The formulation phase is where we in our project have to ask us the following 
questions; firstly, what is the plan for dealing with the problem? Secondly, who are the participating 
actors? Thirdly, which roles do the actors have in the policy formulation process? Fourthly, what 
are the goals and priorities of the policy? And finally, what was the final decision that gave the 
policy governmental legitimacy? 
To elaborate, the first three stages of the policy circle concern how a problem becomes an issue on 
the EMU agenda, how it is formulated, which form it takes and which actors have taken decisions 
to form the policy. This is essential to our project to be able characterise and discuss the crisis 
management of the Euro-area and the underlying mechanisms causing it. 
4.5 The policy network  
Having presented the theoretical tools for faming the policy process, we proceed to a deeper level in 
our policy analysis and will in the following present R.A.W. Rhodes‟ policy network, which we 
will use to investigate the field of actors and their network-based interactions within the stages of 
the policy process.  
In our analysis we depart from Rhodes‟ concept of a policy network as a construction for 
understanding the actors and their actions within the two policy processes of crises management 
regarding the national bank packages and the Greek rescue-plan respectively. Rhodes defines a 
policy network “as a cluster of organisations interconnected by resource dependencies” (Rhodes 
1997: 37). He elaborates this definition so that the network varies depending on the stability, 
insularity and the strength of resource dependencies between the  members within the network 
(Peterson 2009: 108). Since our main area of interest is not solely to determine the nature of the 
network, but more importantly the relationship between the organisations within the network, the 
three above mentioned determinants will be outlined as part of gaining a deeper understanding of 
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the organisations themselves. First we need to enhance what we understand when talking about 
policy networks.  
We accept Rhodes‟ definition of a network as having an overall horizontal structure and an inter-
organisational nature meaning that the policy process is not submitted under an all-dominant core of 
government. Nor is interpersonal relations ascribed much significance. When considering the 
complex composition of the EMU‟s institutional structure, it bears high resemblances to Rhodes 
definition of the nature of a network. Also we recognize that relatively few organisations are 
actually involved in the policy process while emphasising the structural relationship between these 
organisations as the crucial element in the policy network theory (Rhodes 1997: 36). Understanding 
this structural relationship provides us with tools to investigate how power is exercised and by 
whom within the Euro-area. 
4.5.1 The organisations and their resources  
Elaborating on Rhodes the definition of the term organisation refers to in our case the different EU 
institutions, political as well as technocratic, and the member states within the euro-area. These 
organisations are interconnected in a horizontal structure and their relations constitute a game, in 
which every organisation strives at gaining relative power advantages and thus greater saying in the 
policy process. The outcome of this game is determined by the resources of the organisations, being 
constitutional- legal (e.g. votes), organisational (e.g. professional expertise within the ECB), 
financial (e.g. economic power of Germany), political (e.g. France and Germany with their 
historical importance and voting supremacy), or informal (Rhodes 1997: 9). Consequently different 
resources provide the organisations with differentiated bargaining power in form of altered 
legitimacy, expertise or economic power. The resources of the organisations vary according to their 
interests and specialisations within the area. Depending on the policy-area in question there will 
therefore be great variations in who constitute the dominant coalition5 and whether or not it is 
possible for such an entity to appear (Peterson 2009: 107). In order to understand the 
interorganisational relationship of the network, we need first to establish who the organisations are 
                                                 
5 Being the organisations who possess the most (significant) resources. 
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and which resources they possess, to determine the relative bargaining power of each organisation. 
This is additionally intertwined with the rules of the game6.  
The foundation of Rhodes‟ policy network theory rests on five basic propositions about 
organisations and their interactions drawing on a theory of power-dependence7. Firstly, we accept 
that all the organisations within a network are dependent upon each other for resources. Secondly, 
we accept that the organisations must exchange resources in order to achieve the desired policy 
outcomes. Thirdly, we accept that interorganisational decision-making is constrained by other 
organisations even though the dominant coalition holds a relatively higher level of autonomy. 
Furthermore, through its appreciative system8 the dominant coalition influences which 
interorganizational relationships is viewed ill upon and which resources will be collectively sought. 
Fourthly, we accept that the dominant coalition employs strategies to regulate the process of 
exchange of resources, but that these are restricted by the well-known rules of the game. And 
finally, we accept that the level of autonomy held by the dominant coalition is determined by the 
policy subject and its subsequent goals and the relative power potential of interacting organisations 
in the network. High profile policy issues necessarily foster stronger positions regarding policy 
goals held by the individual organisations comprising the network. The relative power potential of 
each organisation is then a result of their resources, the process of exchange between organisations 
and of the rules of the game (Rhodes, 1997; 37). Accepting these five assumptions enables us to 
analyze the interorganisational relationship within the network of the EMU.  
 
                                                 
6 In the Euro-area the „rules of the game‟ refer to the different forms of accepted negotiation manners between the 
organisations, i.e. formal and informal patterns of action acknowledged by all members of the network.  
7 The power-dependence provide the policy network theory with its explanatory motor, explaining the interaction and 
distribution of power within the network (Rhodes 1997; 9).  
8 In the policy research it is important to recognise that all sides to any given argument have their supportive analytic 
evidence, thus neatly reducing the argument to the underlying values, which is the heart of the problem with the policy 
approach (deLeon & Vogenbeck 2007; 9). A central concept in understanding this interconnectedness is Rhodes‟ 
(1997; 193) appreciative system, which refers to those factual and value judgements which combined constitutes the 
subjective reality of an actor. We do not wish to investigate this system, but accept it as a determining factor when 
analysing the intensions and thus actions taken by key actors in our policy analysis.       
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4.5.2 Theoretical perception of the EMU as a network  
In order to gain the above mentioned deeper understanding of our organisations and thereby the 
empirical puzzle; the changes of the policy process in the two situations of crisis management¸ we 
need first to determine the actual composition of the network. This will be done based on the 
stability, insularity and the strength of resource dependencies between involved organisations in the 
network.  
The stability of the network refers to the relations between involved organisations i.e. the continuity 
and the restrictiveness of membership. Generally it can be said that in tightly knitted networks the 
level of stability is notably higher than in looser networks. The level of technocracy in the network 
further ads to the stability. The insularity is determined by how segregated the network is from both 
other networks and the public, hence in a tightly integrated network the level of horizontal 
articulation between the network and the outside is very limited. Finally the strength of resource 
dependencies between the organisations comprising the network is defined by the amount of 
interdependence due to extent of shared responsibility for service delivery (Rhodes 1997; 38) in the 
form of policy-outcome. At a general level the rules of the game also serve as a determining factor 
for our network. However while the rules of the game restrict possibilities of interorganisational 
action within the network they are at the same time changeable by the same network and they are 
thus in them self not a constant factor.  
In applying the above presented measurements we will define  the composition of the network 
(Euro-area) and afterwards perceive the network as a constant factor throughout the two policy 
processes. Though Rhodes argues that the network changes according to the policy in question we 
will nevertheless keep the network constant in this project since the policy processes of the two 
crises managements in our research area, though not identical, bear high resemblance. The same 
organisations are involved in the processes of both crises, cooperating under the same overall 
circumstances. By holding the network constant we can go into depth with the complex internal 
economic and political conditions of the interorganisational relations within the policy process of 
each of the two crises managements, and thereby research the relation between these processes. 
This will be done through an exposition of each of the involved organisations and their resources in 
the actual policy process. We will look upon the interests, specialisations and the appreciative 
systems of the organisations, resulting in the nature and the amount of resources held by the 
individual organisation. The transformation of resources into concrete bargaining power is 
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restrained by the „rules of the game‟. Furthermore we will investigate how and by whom a 
dominant coalition is constituted, and its influence on the policy process. Although the network is 
being held constant neither the dominant coalition nor the rules of the game are non-variable. This 
is because of the slight difference in the policy issues and the difference in the historical location of 
the two processes.      
4.5.3 Sum-up of our theoretical framework  
Based on the operationalisation of the theory of policy processes and the polic y circle as well as 
Rhodes theory of policy network, we will demonstrate how the network around the policy processes 
of the crises management within the EMU is constructed, how the policy process proceeded and 
eventually who influenced it and how.  
First, we will depart from the policy network theory and make a general definition of the network: 
Who constitutes it? How stable, insular and internal resource-dependent is it. What are the interests, 
specialisations and appreciative systems of the individual organisations and how are they able to 
materialise these into concrete bargaining power under the rules of the game? This will be done in 
an exposition, theoretically defining the network and its organisations. Secondly, we will turn to 
look at the two policy processes individually, and via an application of the theory of policy 
processes and the policy circle we will seek to understand and conceptualise the dynamics and 
stages of the process in which actions are taken by participating organisations. By separating the 
process into the agenda-setting stage, policy formulation stage and decision-making stage we will 
create a theoretical frame for comprehending the creation of policies, in which organisations 
possesses differentiated resources and thus differentiated level of influence. Thus, this study of the 
policy process will constitute the outer framing of the analysis, whereas the inner framing will 
happen in the third and final part of the analysis, where we will return to Rhodes and his theory of 
policy network. Through extensive empirical data we will extract behavioural patterns of the 
organisations in each of the crisis managements, and find indicators of the ubiquitous power-
dependency and the following allocation of differentiated bargaining power.  
Consequently we will be able to characterise the cooperation within the policy network. This will 
facilitate a determination of the level of cooperation in the two crisis management situations. This 
enables us to establish the degree of change between the two policy processes and whether the first 
crises episode indeed was more nationally oriented and the latter more community oriented and 
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why. Therefore by looking separately at each situation of crisis management we wish to compare 
the actions taken by the organisations in the network and illuminate possible differences in the 
nature of the two policy-solutions, in order to characterise the underlying mechanisms causing the 
apparent shift in crisis management orientation.  
5 The exposition of the policy network  
5.1 Introduction  
In the following we will present firstly an exposition of the policy network of the Euro-area based 
upon the stability, insularity and the internal strength of resource dependencies and the overall rules 
of the game. This is essential for several reasons: first of all to determine the field of actors within 
the policy process. Secondly in order to outline the circumstances under which the two policy-
processes took place. After this exposition of the nature of the network we will move on to 
characterise each organisation‟s relative power potential based on its appreciative system, interest 
and specialisation. Having defined the relative power potential of each organisation we are able to 
engage in an analysis of the power-game between organisations in the two policy processes which 
enables us to present a valid explanation of the different outputs of the two policy processes. But as 
mentioned above we need first to expose the network and its organisations. We will begin with a 
presentation of each of the involved organisations in the network.  
5.2 The organisations of the network  
The network of the two policy processes is, as described in the Operationalisation, a constant factor 
and even though the organisations are of different importance in the two processes, the composition 
remains identical. The network is thus composed by the following organisations: the European 
Commission, the European Council, the Ecofin Council, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the Eurosystem as well as Germany and France. Consequently, we operate with a total 
of eight organisations, being political or technocratic, EU institutions or nationally based, but 
common to them all is that their possibilities of action are restricted by the rules of the game. The 
rules of the game refer to the constitutional structural framework in which organisations act. They 
refer to the possibilities or impossibilities of action for each of the organisations within the policy 
process, i.e. whether they can affect the policy process in the agenda setting, formulation or 
decision-making stage.  
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Whereas the inclusion of European institutions as relevant organisations in the policy network 
surrounding the crises management is more or less obvious, the inclusion of the two member states 
(and consequently the exclusion of the 14 others) is less so. One could rightfully argue that every 
one of the 16 member states that have accepted the euro as their currency should represent an 
organisation within the network. But drawing on Rhodes we acknowledge that the actual number of 
involved organisations within a relatively tightly organised policy network, like that of the Euro-
area, is rather limited. Thus, only the nation-states possessing high amounts of resources constitute 
their own organisation. The remaining actors must, despite different nationalities, operate through 
EU institutions. Hence, the power relations between organisations hold great significance in 
determining network membership. In the Eurogroup member states are formally represented 
equally, so the power relationship between organisations does not vary, but in the Ecofin Council a 
member state‟s share of votes is determined by its population as well as its share of EU‟s GDP. 
Thus, the member states with the greatest saying are Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom 
who hold 29 votes each9. Their economies furthermore comprise the „European Big Four‟. Since the 
UK is not a part of the Euro-area they are excluded from the network. Italy, France and Germany all 
hold equal share of votes in Ecofin Council. Despite this we did not include Italy into the network. 
This is mostly due to Italy becoming significantly less competitive over the years as a result of poor 
productivity growth which have also generated a deficit on the balance of payments and a notable 
government debt, amounting to 17,000 EUR per head (Marsh 2009: 230). These economic 
weaknesses have resulted in a relatively lower level of economic resources and the weakening of 
the power position of Italy. Therefore, we allow ourselves to discount Italy as an organisation in 
itself. Instead, Italian interest must be represented through EU institutions inside the network. The 
same goes for the remaining 13 countries being part of the Euro-area. This leaves us with Germany 
and France as the only nationally based organisations. One reason for this status is their superior 
economic resources as these two are by far the biggest economies within the Euro-area; together 
they make up half of EMU GDP. The other is their historical and political significance with regards 
to EU decision-making. The two countries have constituted the mainspring of European cooperation 
since the Rome Treaty in 1957 (Marsh 2009; 10). Having argued for the choice of organisations in 
the network we commence on describing each of them, their appreciative systems and their 
resources in the policy process.   
                                                 
9 Unless otherwise listed all informat ion about the Council of the European Union and the Ecofin Council is from the 
official homepage: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?lang=en  
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5.3 The nature of the network 
The policy network‟s stability, insularity and the strength of the resource-dependency between 
involved organisations are determining factors that influence the inter-organisational relations and 
consequently the policy outcome. The stability and the insularity of the network of the Euro-area 
are largely a result of the technocratic nature of the policies dealt with by the network. This is 
because this technocracy heightens the stability in membership by limiting the number of possible 
members to ones engaged in and having knowledge regarding the area of economics which is 
underlined by the organisations of our network. Elaborately, within the field of economics which 
create basis for our policy network the degree of change in the underlying ideas and values is 
extremely limited. These things combined, have an insulating effect on the network through 
creating a gap between the public and the network due to the complexity of the policy issues. To 
some extend this applies to the relation to other networks as well.  
Internally the network consists of a wide range of organisations with different ideas, and frequently 
different expectations to the network. There are high restrictions on who constitutes a member 
compared to other policy networks within the EU that are more loosely bounded. This is 
exemplified through interest organisations having as such no direct access to the network thereby 
not being able to affect the policy process. Furthermore there is little replacement of the 
organisations within the network. The only vague sign of alteration of its structure is the 
formalisation of both the European Council and the Eurogroup with the Treaty of Lisbon which is 
then a slight change in the rules of the game. This change is, however, not very relevant to our 
analysis since these organisations were present in the network  prior to the formalisation and the 
actual shape, purpose and possibility of the Eurogroup is the same.   
The organisations comprising the network also differ significantly in degree of insularity. An 
example hereof is the ECB which holds a very high level of independence. To quote Helmut 
Schmidt (4th of September 2007):  “The European Central Bank is the most independent in the 
world. There is no counter-balance that is anchored in a framework.” (Marsh 2009: 227) 
Additionally, the articulation by the ECB to its external environment is minimal, as they do not 
publish summaries of their meetings (Marsh 2009; 224). By contrast, the members of the Ecofin 
Council are nationally elected and thus answer to their national populations. Therefore, the 
horizontal articulation streaming from the Ecofin to its external environment is more 
comprehensive. Consequently, the possibilities of action are very different from that of the ECB.  
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As for the third factor, the strength of the resource-dependency between involved organisations in 
the network is very high. This is because of the shared responsibility for the wellbeing of the 
common currency. Thus, even though interests may not coincide and in spite of diversity and an 
uneven distribution of resources the organisations are bound together via the Euro. Another 
example of resource-dependency is the structure of European banking which is no longer separated 
and segregated according to national borders. On the contrary several European banks are 
interconnected via investments among them.     
The nature of the policy network of the euro-area is the sum of these three determinants. 
Membership appears to be highly restricted due to the technocratic nature of the policy issues. This 
creates a relatively insular network. As the organisations are connected to one another by the Euro 
there is a high level of shared responsibilities for service delivery through policies. As an opposing 
example the UK is not as interdependent since they continuously have their own currency which 
makes them less dependent on a joint policy solution. Because of the common currency and the 
European banking interdependency, the strength of the inter-organisational resource-dependency is 
high. This all together creates a highly stable network. The stability of the cooperation is enhanced 
by the fact that the possibility of leaving the cooperation was only formalised in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Prior to this there officially/constitutionally did not exist a possibility of exiting the network.   
Having determined the nature of the network we can commence on describing the individual 
organisations and the „rules of the game‟ under which they operate. 
5.4 Relative power potential and the rules of the game 
In the following, we describe the organisations and their individual bargaining power. This will be 
done on the basis of the above mentioned understanding of the network as an entity in order to 
expose their individual relative power potentials.   
5.4.1The European Council 
With the entry of the Lisbon Treaty the European Council became an officially acknowledged 
institution in the EU. Before this it operated as an informal forum for discussions between the 
leaders of EU-countries. It consists of the Heads of States of governments of the EU member-states. 
The overall goal of this gathering is to define the overall direction and priorities of the EU. It meets 
twice every six months and takes decisions primarily by consensus, however depending on what the 
Treaty provides for, unanimity or qualified majority is also possibilities. It has got no legislative 
functions but can communicate recommendations to other organisations (the European Council v. 
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an official institution of the EU). This is possible through all of the three stages of the policy cycle, 
where the European Council can communicate its stance on any given problem. The appreciative 
system of the European Council is oriented towards pointing out the general direction of the EU. 
Therefore this organisation will arguably have a community oriented perspective.   
5.4.2 The European Commission 
The European Commission10 refers either to the „College of Commissioners‟, consisting of the 27 
commissioners, each commissioner is proposed by their member states ‟ governments (though they 
do not represent their national government). Among these a president is elected by the European 
Council. Since 2004 the president of the European Commission has been José Manuel Durão 
Barroso. The European Commission also refers to the entire institution, an administrative body 
divided into several departments and institutions. The department for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (ECFIN) and its Directorate-General reports to the Commissioner of Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, since February 2010 Olli Rehn, and before him (2004-2010) Joaquín Almunia. 
Acting under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the 
College of Commissioners and in close cooperation with other Commission departments the main 
task for ECFIN is to monitor economic and financial performance and compliance of member states  
(Organisations v. Directorate Economic and Financial Affairs).  
The European Commission is the sole institution with the legislative initiative. Post the Treaty of 
Lisbon (December 2009) the Commission has also become the only executive body within the EU. 
Before the entry of the treaty this was a power shared with the Council of the European Union. 
Additionally, the Council could ignore the Commission and act arbitrarily. The legislative initiative 
provides the Commission as an entity with considerable political resources in the agenda setting 
stage and it frequently acts as a policy entrepreneur (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet 2010: 23). An 
interesting question in relation to these agenda setting powers is on which ground it evaluates what 
should become a problem on the agenda and what should not. One source of information is the 
Eurosystem as the Commissioner of Economic and Financial affairs participates in its meetings. 
Another source by which the Commissioner is provided with information is the ECFIN who 
collaborates with several other entities before passing it on. Among the institutions which ECFIN 
engages in cooperation with are the ECOFIN, the Eurogroup and the ECB. Therefore, the 
information received by the Commissioner is the product of many preceding exchanges and 
                                                 
10 Unless otherwise listed all informat ion about the European Commission is from the official homepage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm 
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interactions. Besides this the Commissioner, though without the capacity to vote, participates in 
Eurogroup meetings where he is arguably also affected regarding agenda setting.    
But the Commission‟s monopoly over the EU‟s legislative agenda is mostly formal. Peterson (2001; 
304) argues that the Commission‟s legislative power is more truthfully viewed as a resource that 
may be used in bargaining over the shape and content of the EU‟s legislative agenda. This is due to 
the structure of EU governance, where the legislative agenda is negotiated between an extremely 
diverse collection of organisations. Thus, the ECFIN conducts policy bargaining in close 
relationship with other organisations with interest in the area; such as the Council of Economics and 
Finance Ministers in the EU (ECOFIN Council), the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, and 
also Member State authorities and the European Central Bank (ECB). It is reasonable to assume that 
in so doing the actions of the Commission will reflect a determination to represent the EU as a 
whole since this organisation is an EU institution designed to uphold the collective interest of the 
Union acting as a supranational authority. These values and norms are, in the words of Rhodes, at 
the centre of the Commission‟s appreciative system which is therefore highly community oriented.   
5.4.3 The Ecofin Council and Eurogroup 
The Economic and Financial Affairs Council is one of the oldest configurations of the Councils of 
the European Union, commonly known simply as Ecofin11. Ecofin is composed of economic and 
financial ministers (as well as budget ministers when occasion requires it) of all the 27 member 
states. Therefore, the appreciative system of the Ecofin will be a product of power games between 
the countries represented. Consequently the degree of community or national orientation is 
determined by which values and interests gain prominent status as a result of these games.  
Within the Ecofin Council resolution is mostly reached by qualified majority, i.e. if a majority of 
Member States approves and a minimum of 255 votes out of a total of 345 is cast in favour of a 
proposal. The exception is fiscal matters which are decided by unanimity. As a final re solution a 
Member State can ask for confirmation that the votes in favour represent at least 62% of the total 
population of the Union. Ecofin has legislative authority over economic and financial matters in the 
EU, as well as co-decision with the European Parliament on some subjects, i.a. the internal market. 
Therefore, it possesses political resources in the decision-making stage which the Commission is 
dependent on for their proposals to proceed in the policy process. The Ecofin Council works with 
                                                 
11 Unless otherwise listed all informat ion about the Council of the European Union and the Ecofin Council is from the 
official homepage: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?lang=en  
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economic policy coordination and economic surveillance in relation to financial markets and capital 
movements and with monitoring of member states' budgetary policy and public finances. Finally, 
Ecofin deals with issues relating to the Euro, be it practical, legal or international aspects. But it is 
important to note that only member states that have adopted the euro as their currency can vote on 
decisions regarding the euro.  
A consequence hereof was the creation of the Eurogroup, which started out as a non-formal 
subdivision of the Ecofin council with no legal basis – put in the words of Uwe Puetter (2002) “an 
informal ministerial forum for intensive policy dialogue” but it was formalised with the Treaty of 
Lisbon in December 2009. The Eurogroup consists of the 16 member states which have adopted the 
euro. Consequently, as in the case of the Ecofin, its appreciative system results from power plays 
between the states due to this organisation‟s intergovernmental character. However, the resource 
dependency between Eurogroup members, which we will get back to, increases the likelihood of 
reaching agreement about a direction. On the other hand, it could be argued that since resource 
dependency stemming from having the same currency makes the issue of the euro all the mo re 
important to the members they are less likely to compromise or stray from their own position on the 
matter. Besides the ministers representing the euro-area states, the Eurogroup consists of the 
following non-voting attendants: the presidents of the Eurogroup, the EU Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Commissioner and the Chairman of the Eurogroup Working Group. In addition, the ECB 
president and vice president normally attend though they do not have the right to vote either (Marsh 
2009; 222). Within the Eurogroup decisions are taken about the overall orientation of the economic 
governance in the euro area, and agreements are reached about how to employ core EMU policy 
instruments (Puetter 2006; 1). However, it is the Ecofin Council, and not the Eurogroup, that 
reaches formal resolution regarding the process of coordination of fiscal policies within the EU. 
This makes the Eurogroup a place of information exchange regarding the health of member states‟ 
economy and conduct of policies with no formal authority over its member states and no actual 
power to make bindings decisions (Panico 2010; 5). But the Eurogroup possesses informal 
resources in the decision-making stage since they meet the day before Ecofin meetings. Here they 
obtain a head start in negotiations. If the Eurogroup can agree on a direction and then pursue this in 
unison they will have relatively large chance of succeeding, whether it means a refusal or 
acceptance of policy. Thus, the rules of the game still allow for the Eurogroup to significantly affect 
the decision-making stage. Moreover the fact that the Commissioner for Economic and Financial 
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Affairs participates in their meetings gives the Eurogroup the possibility of influencing the agenda 
setting stage as well. 
5.4.4 The European Central Bank 
Within the EMU economic policy is decentralized, so that fiscal policy is decided by national  
governments, while decisions about monetary policy are taken at a supra-national level (Panico 
2010: 4). The organisation responsible for this policy area is theoretically the European System of 
Central Banks, which consists of the European Central Bank and the national central banks of all 
the 27 member states12. However, within the Euro-area it is the Eurosystem (comprised by the ECB 
and the 16 national central banks of the member states who have adopted the euro as their currency) 
and not the ESCB that makes the EMU monetary policies. These policy decisions are enforced 
through the rules established by the Treaties, thus determining the behaviour of member states‟ 
central banks (Panico 2010: 4) since the Eurosystem can pose impediments to national banks that 
do not uphold its directions. 
The primary goal of the ECB is to prevent inflation and maintain price stability (as stated in the 
Maastricht Treaty, Article 107) among the EMU members. In the case that national governments in 
any of these member states should attempt to follow a policy diverging from that laid out by the 
ECB, the institutional framework established by the Treaty of Maastricht would pose an 
impediment to such actions (Schafer 2006: 189). Thus, the ECB has the ability to impose 
constraints on the actions of the member states which can only alter the ECB‟s mandate if able to 
reach unanimous consensus on the matter. In order for the ECB to achieve its goals it has been 
granted substantial independence as laid out explicitly in the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 108) 
stating that:  
“When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred 
upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a 
national central bank, nor any member of the decision-making bodies shall 
seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any 
government of a Member State or from any other body.”  
Consequently, the ECB and thus both the ESCB and the Eurosystem has formal status as 
organisations freed from political interference. This is further underlined by the fact that votes cast 
                                                 
12 Unless otherwise listed all informat ion about the European Central Bank, the ESCB and the Eurosystem is from the 
official homepage: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/ index.en.html 
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within ECB surroundings in its decision-making processes are not made public as to avoid exposing 
members of the Governing Council to domestic pressures. Separating the ECB from such national 
influences has the effect that the appreciative systems of the ECB and the Eurosystem are clearly 
community oriented.  
The Governing Council is the main decision-making body of the ECB. It is comprised by the 
Executive Board and the governor of each of the national central banks of the 16 countries in the 
euro-area. The Executive board has a total of six members: the President  Jean-Claude Trichet, the 
vice president (who until the end of May 2010 was Lucas D. Papademos) Vítor Constâncio and four 
others all of whom are elected by Euro-area members of the European Council. Bearing in mind the 
intention to establish the ECB as a depoliticised entity it is worth drawing attention to the fact that 
the Executive Board nevertheless mirrors the distribution of power in the EMU so that Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain all have a seat (France currently holds the Presidency. This constellation 
prevails though Italy and Spain are economically weak) (Dosenrode 2002: 65), which could suggest 
that the Executive Board is, contrary to the political independence stated in the Treaty, under the 
influence of national interests. Counteracting this is the fact that, contrary to national bank 
governors, who at some extend depend on their national governments for reappointment at the end 
of their terms, members of ECB Executive Board are selected for a non-renewable eight years in 
order to reinforce the independence. However Marsh (2009; 317) argues that they can still be 
exposed to pressure from national governments, especially if they are young enough to seek 
employment after their departure from the ECB.  
It is worth noticing that neither ECB the ESCB nor the Eurosystem can be regarded as totally 
insulated organisations. A divide as sharp as stated in the Treaty can in pract ice be very difficult to 
maintain because of the high degree of political interest in the area. Therefore, a degree of influence 
from member states through the European Council is by no means unlikely (Dosenrode 2002: 58). 
Furthermore, in order to fulfil its function the ECB cannot separate itself completely from the 
political processes in the European Union and it is necessary for ECB to partake in political 
networks so as to gain information and contacts (Dosenrode 2002: 50f). These relations may be 
informal in character but the ECB is connected to the political fora of the Union in formal ways as 
well, as mentioned above: the president and vice president of the ECB may participate in Eurogroup 
meetings and the ECB is a member of the ECFIN. These connections constitute ways in which the 
ECB can exercise influence based on its high amounts of organisational resources in the form of 
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expertise. Another link consists in that when the Governing Council of the ECB meets twice a 
month in Frankfurt, Germany to decide on the monetary policy either by unanimity or by a broad 
consensus (Marsh 2009; 224) the President of the Council of Ministers and a member of the 
Commission have the right to participate though not to vote. The same limit goes for the entitlement 
of the President of the European Council and a member of the European Commission to attend the 
meetings of the General Council. More broadly, the meetings of the Eurosystem are frequently 
attended by the Eurogroup president and the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(Marsh 2009; 222) Here the Eurosystem is able to stress problems which they as experts view as 
important which the Commissioner and the Eurogroup president can then take into account thereby 
acting as links between the economic and the political sphere. So, despite the intention of freeing 
the Eurosystem from political interference they can still play an important part in the agenda setting 
stage. Since they act as experts of economy a statement posed by them would be taken seriously by 
the policy-makers. 
Having illuminated the importance of the Eurogroup, it is interesting to look into its internal 
distribution of resources since it is a determining factor for the power structure. Several of the 
economically weaker nations such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece are heavily dependent on 
both French and German banks which own parts of several banks in each of these countries. 
Coupled with the sheer size of the German and French economy, respectively, this indicates that the 
distribution of economic resources favours Germany and France.  
To show whether the same applies to the distribution of resources of legitimacy we will now, 
having established the EU-bound institutions within the network their appreciative systems and 
resources, lay out historical background of the creation of the EMU underlining the historic 
importance of Germany and France in the developmental process.  
5.5 Brief historical background of Germany and France  
To elaborate on and underpin our choice of France and Germany as individual organisations within 
the network of the Euro-area we have included a brief historical outlining of the history of the Euro 
with a specific focus on the relationship between the two countries. This is due to the continuous 
interplay and rivalry between them throughout the years before and after the creation of the Euro. 
This relationship has resulted in certain patterns of power which have an influence on the policy 
process within the network today. 
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Both France and Germany played vital roles in the forming of the Euro. These roles often mirrored 
different strands of economic thinking, which have resulted in various disagreements regarding how 
to structure the economic cooperation in Europe. The disagreements became apparent already in 
1961 where the first stirs towards a European economic cooperation started. The European 
Community was alerted by a German and Dutch revaluation of their currencies and France and 
Belgium in particular stressed the importance of a monetary unification. They argued that currency 
disturbances would undermine the common market in Europe and that the only way to overcome 
this problem was to create a thorough economic and monetary cooperation. The position held by 
Germany, represented by the Bundesbank, underlined the monetary ideological gap. They argued 
that currency flexibility was important in order to prevent inflation. These overall differences in the 
economic line of thinking were primarily based on one crucial issue: whether or not money should 
be the instrument or the objective of economic governance (Marsh, 2009; 38-40).  
In the following years the described economic ideological difference between the two countries 
surfaced several times. When looking at the actual design of the EMU-cooperation there is no doubt 
that the German line of thinking is prominent. In the words of the German finance minister in 1991, 
the Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union “bears the German hallmark” (Marsh 2009: 132). 
One could argue that a German finance minister would always underline the explicit German 
characteristics of the cooperation. However, even the French president Mitterand acknowledged 
this. In his words the whole of Europe was in any case subordinate to the German will, in that for 
example an increase in the interest rates in Germany forced the other countries to follow suit. The 
only way of having a say, he argued, would be to create a European Central Bank; even if it would 
be inspired by the German model (Marsh, 2009; 135). This position is supported by Paul Volcker, 
former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, who in 2007 characterised the French-German 
relationship as sort of a paradox seen from a French point of view: France never liked to be 
subordinate to Germany but since they did not have either the power, currency or authority to 
dominate over Germany in monetary questions, they had to cling on to the development of the D-
mark. Hence the paradox: In order to stand up to the Germans they had to be subservient to them in 
following their lead regarding questions of European monetarism (Marsh 2009: 68).  
According to Gerhard Schröder, former German Chancellor, the German rise in competitiveness 
along with the German economy being the “strongest economy in Europe”, means that they have 
less inflation, which was one of the initial German goals. The close cooperation as a result of the 
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creation of the EMU creates a situation in which the other countries comprising the Euro-area are 
not able to devalue in order to obtain European economic equilibrium (Marsh 2009: 221). France 
therefore expresses severe dissatisfaction with the development away from the initial objective with 
the economic cooperation to the actual reality. A senior official in Sarkozy‟s government stated: 
“(…) We were expecting a tool of monetary diplomacy. A great deal of effort has gone into this, but 
all the power is in Frankfurt” (Marsh 2009: 219). The fact that Germany was the main determinant 
of the shape of the EMU can give this organisation a certain ethos and legitimacy resources when 
taking part in policy processes. However, it should not be overlooked that this legitimacy has not 
been legally transformed into political resources. In the Executive Board of the ECB as well as the 
Eurogroup all members formally enjoy equal representation and, as pointed out, the number of 
votes held by Germany in the ECOFIN is equal to that of the UK, Italy and France.  
5.6 Sum up 
In the previous we have exposed the network of the Euro-area as being stable and insular due to the 
technocratic nature of the policy field. Furthermore we argued for the existence of resource 
dependency as a result of the common currency and the structure of European banking. These 
characteristics result in a network which is highly stable and insular. This means that any outcome 
from a policy process will be a result of bargaining between the members of the network. Therefore 
it becomes interesting to move on to understanding the internal dynamics of the network. Here we 
established that the various organisations posses different appreciative systems and interests which 
shapes their desired outcome of a given policy which are then restricted by the rules of the game.       
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6 Analysis of bank-packages & TEAP 
6.1Introduction 
In the forthcoming section the two policy solutions to overcome the liquidity and solvency crisis 
and the financial crisis in Greece will be analysed. This will be done in order to shed light on the 
apparent shift in crisis management which initially sparked our interest. Using the policy cycle 
theory allows us to organize the two policy processes into stages – that of agenda setting, 
formulation and decision-making. In each of these stages the organisations comprising the network 
of the Euro-area have different opportunities of affecting the output of the policy. By theoretically 
applying Rhodes‟ policy network theory we can use the exposition of the network to understand the 
power plays they carried out in their efforts to do so. Using Rhodes‟ theory to assess the influence 
of each organisation enables us to evaluate who, if any, constituted the dominant coalition in each 
of the policy processes and what the interests and appreciative systems of these organisations are. 
Thereby we can discuss and compare the two policy solutions to illuminate why there was a change 
and whether or not this change can be said to reflect a movement from nationally oriented to 
community oriented crisis management.   
6.2 Analysis part one  
In the first part of the analysis we will illuminate the policy process concerning the bank-package 
which was agreed upon on the 15th-16th of October. But first we present the pre-crisis conditions for 
crisis management within the EMU. This is primarily done in order to evaluate to which degree 
there can be said to have been a change of crisis management from before the actual crisis hit to the 
handling of the Greek crisis.  
6.2.1The pre-crisis conditions 
Throughout the history of the EMU there has not been a clear definition of EU‟s position as a 
lender-of-last-resort in the case that pan-European banks experience liquidity problems, neither was 
there a fully developed and operational rescue plan to tack le a potential crisis. There have been 
warnings that the EU would not be well prepared if an economic crisis was to emerge due to the 
structural composition of the EMU and the lack of resources within the policy network. This is 
supported by Alexandre Lamfalussy, the first president of the European monetary institute 13, who 
                                                 
13 The European Institute was the forerunner for the European Central Bank – it was dissolved with the creation of the 
ECB in 1998 – and its purpose was to encourage integration and cooperation between national banks in the EU.  
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proclaimed that a crisis situation would be particularly grave in case of a cross-national liquidity or 
insolvency crisis (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 1).   
The monetary policies of Euro-area member states are decided by the ECB, whereas the fiscal are 
the responsibility of each state. Normally, monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated but at time 
of crisis the way to proceed is not clear (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 1). For example, the 
integration process of the banking sector has led to a dilemma in the supervision and transparency 
of financial policies. The integration of banks across national borders leaves some problems for host 
and home country. The home country is responsible for the supervision of financial institutions but 
has no authority over the host countries‟ financial policies. Also, the host country is responsible for 
the financial stability but does not have the authority over foreign financial institutions. Thereby 
foreign banks in host countries operate in some kind of grey area with no real supervision. This 
leaves the European Union with practically no control as the nationa lly based supervision 
arrangement did not follow as the banks placed a greater amount of subsidies in other EMU states 
(Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 13). Consequently, the financial stability and crisis management 
responsibility lies with the nation-states‟ authorities and it is the central bank of the nation in 
question which is the distributor of liquidity assistance to banks. This also applies in the case of 
cross-border banks operating in their country. So, as the distribution of liquidity is handled by the 
local central bank, the risk of insufficient flow of information and lack of cooperation between 
home and host countries is likely to occur.  
In time of crisis when actions have to be taken fast the cooperation within the Euro-area derives 
from a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU): a set of principles for cooperation and sharing of 
information between central banks and crisis management institutions. The MoU is not an official 
document, but rather perceived as a gentlemen‟s agreement based on a press release from May 2005 
according to which:   
“(…) it consists of principles and procedures that deal specifically with the 
identification of the authorities responsible for crisis management, the required flow of 
information between all the involved authorities and the practical conditions for 
sharing information at the cross-border level (…)” (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 2). 
This leaves ECB with no privileged access to information from nation-states and no assignation as a 
lender-at- last-resort by the Treaty of Maastrich. This severely limits the amount of resources of the 
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ECB in the network Moreover, as the financial crisis unfolded it was up to the national treasuries of 
the Euro-area member states to solve the emerging solvency crisis, since the EMU does not posses 
an adequate treasury for solving the solvency crisis in the inter–bank marked (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 
2010: 2).  The ECB does, however, posses some resources: firstly, established ECB mechanisms 
ensure a flow of information within the Eurosystem, which enables the system to act 
homogenously. Secondly, even though the ECB is not the lender-of- last-resort it still controls the 
flow of liquidity in the Euro-area, as no one else is capable of such a task (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 
2010: 2).  
This above mentioned structure for crisis management was the point of departure before the 
liquidity and solvency crisis emerged on the Euro-area agenda, i.e. single-state crisis managements 
and a cooperative framework based on common understanding through the MoU, together with the 
constitutionally determined inter-organisational relations14. This already existing structure for crisis 
management comprises the rules of the game within which the organisations unfold their resources 
and bargaining power.    
6.2.2 Policy analysis of the bank-package 
When the bank crisis of 2007 erupted in Europe the above mentioned tools and strategies were the 
kind of crisis management that the Euro-area had at their disposal.  In the following section we will 
look at how the crisis management unfolded, focusing on the policies and actions taken and their 
underlying considerations, regarding the crisis in the Euro-area. Furthermore, we will make a policy 
analysis using the policy cycle and Rhodes‟ policy network theory, describing the policy from the 
agenda setting phase to the decision-making phase. We will analyse the crisis management of the 
Euro-area member states through a chronological run through based on empirical data concerning 
the solvency and liquidity crisis from August 2007, where the financial crisis began, until October 
2008.     
6.2.2.1 Agenda setting 
In August 2007, the first signs of a liquidity crisis showed that national central banks had to provide 
an injection of liquidity to the banking market. This made the ECB act with the first measure of 
emergency liquidity by establishing a sum of nearly 100 billion EUR in short term financing to 
banks in the Euro-area (Hodson & Quaglia 2009: 940). The possibility of the liquidity crisis turning 
into a solvency crisis made the ECB launch a report made the previous year. By September 2007 a 
                                                 
14 As elaborated on in 4.5 
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general framework of crisis management within the EU was presented. The report stressed the 
importance of cooperation among members and the need to consider the situation a common 
problem that should be addressed by a cohesive Union (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 3). Due to the 
nature of the ECB and its isolations from political enter-state quarrels, such a statement is clearly a 
statement of recommending cooperation on the supra-national level. This should be viewed in the 
light of the appreciative system of the ECB, which affects how they allocate their values and thus 
moulds their interests. These interests can be advocated by the ECB in the agenda setting stage. 
When releasing a report they draw on their prominent resources in the form of high amounts of 
expert knowledge to affect the Commission before this organisation puts the problem on the 
agenda. The ECB action to establish the emergency liquidity brought for the first time the crisis to 
the EMU level and thus opened a window for a collaborative policy on the area. The action was 
restricted to inter bank relations, though; concerning only the flow of liquidity and it did not reach a 
political economic level.  
The financial crisis reached the political economic level in October when the Ecofin Council agreed 
on some common principles based on cooperation in the attempt to tackle the financial instability 
and provide a sound cooperative framework for the cross-border financial crisis of the EMU. Like 
the ECB, the Ecofin Council emphasised that joint action was of common interest and that 
cooperation was central but had to be restricted by the EU state aid rules 15. Consequently, the 
Ecofin Council agreed on some common principles for action taken to counteract financial 
instability but not for the prevention of bank failures (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 3). The initiatives 
looked more like a reminder of what was agreed upon in the MoU as it did not have any 
fundamental changes compared to previous crisis management schemes (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 
2010: 3). Though it was therefore not a crucial step forward in the policy process it did 
nevertheless, promote the agenda-setting process. 
The financial situation got worse in September 2008 with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, 
adding to the importance of an EMU level management of the financial crisis. Because of the 
American turbulence the confidence in the banking sector became even lower and eventually 
unleashed a solvency problem in European banks forcing the first bank bail-outs in Europe by 
                                                 
15 EU State Aid is constituted to preserve fair competition within the single market and ensure that the aid provided by 
the states, in our case to the banks, does not conflict with rules prescribed in the State aid rules. The commission 
solemnly holds the power to determine if the aid is in conflict or compatib le with the single market.  
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/europe/state-aid  
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national governments. These responses were coordinated between France and the Benelux 
countries, but they did not alter the competitive grounds as it was in the interest of all, due to the 
interdependence of the EMU-banking sector, to prevent bank failures. Soon after though, another 
problem came to the fore, which led to an EMU level attempt of coordination: On September the 
30th the bank solvency crisis made the Irish government act to provide security and guarantees for 
all deposits and debt of six national banks and their subsidiaries. This was not a popular move 
within the European Union, as it undermined other member state ‟s deposit and debt guarantees 
which led to nervous turmoil, i.e. the 100 percent guarantee would give competitive disadvantages 
to other states and make the liquid assets move towards Ireland. It therefore pushed EMU member 
states to start national initiatives with cross-border implications and risks (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 
2010: 4).  
From the above we can say that the political stream increased as the EMU and the member states 
acknowledged the magnitude of the problem and thereby increasing the problem stream. Both the 
ECB and the Ecofin Council released reports that emphasized the importance of cooperation to 
reach a solution to the solvency crisis by which they increased the problem stream as “a certain 
problem needs to be addressed through political action, such as policies” (See; 4.4.1). Furthermore, 
the bank-package made by Ireland forced the other countries in the network to react in order to 
avoid distortion amongst them. This entailed that the sentiment, both nationally and supra-
nationally, grew for a plan to manage the crisis and thereby which meant a further increase of the 
political stream.  
These actions and the interaction between the political and problem stream, entailed that a window 
of opportunity opened, through which the process of crisis management in the EMU was directed 
towards a more specific stage.  
6.2.2.2 Formulation phase 
On the 1st of October the Commission put forward an updated version of the Capital Requirements 
Directives (Regulatory Capital v. European Commission) proposing that banks should not be able 
to lend beyond a certain limit and suggesting improvements of supervision of cross-border 
institutions. In order for that to happen four general guidelines should be followed; 1) enhance 
financial stability, 2) enhance safeguarding of creditor interests, 3) ensure international 
competitiveness of the EU banking sector, and 4) further promote the internal banking 
market integration(Commission Staff working document v. Commission of the European 
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Communities). These proposals of an updated CRD by the Commission represent the shift from 
agenda setting to concrete action on the subject of the financial crisis. Even though they were only 
vague guidelines and they were not to be implemented before 2010, the fact that the Commission 
acts on the financial crisis points to the urgency of the issue. Due to the Commission‟s initiative 
agenda-setting role in the inter-organisational relations determined by the structure of the policy 
network. this action establishes them as policy entrepreneurs and marks the entry of the policy 
process into the formulation phase.    
Another consequence of the Irish bank guarantees was the summit on the 4th of October, hosted by 
Sarkozy. Besides him, Angela Merkel and Gordon Brown were present so the leading economic 
powers of the European Union came together. The European Commission leader Jose Manuel 
Barroso, ECB chief Jean-Claude Trichet and the chairman of the Eurogroup Jean-Claude Juncker 
also attended. This is the first summit discussing the financial challenges where a joint solution 
towards the crisis was sought But as the meeting was relatively informal and also exclusive, 
involving only the more resourceful  organisations of the network, it did not provide an actual 
opportunity for decision-making.  
Even though there is no doubt that the organisations represented at the summit possess high 
amounts of relative bargaining power they could not overrule non-present organisations. But they 
could aspire to agree on a common direction which would shape or even dictate the evolving policy 
process and the decision-making phase. If they were able to join forces and create a coalition they 
would greatly increase their bargaining power. Bargaining power is, according to Rhodes, based on 
legitimacy, expertise and economic power, and since the participants hold all of these assets, they 
would have a power advantage in a later stage of the policy process.  
Before the summit Merkel showed her disagreement with Ireland‟s guarantees to their banks and 
stressed that states should react to the crisis in a balanced way so that it would not harm the other 
EU nations – but that crisis should nevertheless be handled at the national level. In this vein, both 
Merkel and Brown had declared their resistance to a cooperative solution in a European bailout plan 
(No banks bail-out fund for Europe v. BBC News). During the meeting, though, Sarkozy and Brown 
made propositions that would imply that cooperation was necessary. Sarkozy set forth a proposal to 
make a joint rescue-plan of around 300 billion EUR but did not succeed and the plan was rejected. 
Sarkozy also advocated for EU-budget rules under which Euro-area members would be required to 
keep public debt under 60 percent of GDP, in addition to the rule of keeping the budget deficit 
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below 3 percent of GDP laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Barroso agreed with Sarkozy‟s 
suggestions but added that it should be implemented with “flexibility” (EU big four gather for 
financial crisis talks v. EU Observer). Despite Brown‟s attitude towards a common agreement 
before the summit he also set forth a proposal to make a 12 billion euro pool to secure that small 
businesses stay afloat during rough times.  
Even though this meeting gathered the most powerful organisations within the policy network they 
did not possess the decision power to make a final policy. They were, however, able to shape a 
collaborated direction for the next step. What the participants did end up with was an agreement on 
working together to support financial institutions. It points to some influence of community-
orientation. Brown made a public statement assuring families and businesses that liquidity would be 
assured and that European leaders should spread the word that “No sound, solvent bank should be 
allowed to fail through the lack of liquidity”. But community orientation was of a limited kind as 
indicated by the words of Merkel and Sarkozy: Merkel proclaimed that member states should “(…) 
ensure that potential cross-border effects of national decisions are taken in to consideration.” 
(Hodson & Quaglia 2009: 942). Sarkozy declared,  
“Each government will operate with its own methods and means, but in a co-ordinated 
manner” (No banks bail-out fund for Europe v. BBC News). 
 Even though Sarkozy entered the summit with a cooperative view on creating a joint rescue plan 
and European budget rules like the Growth and Stability Pact, he left the summit with a statement 
resembling Merkel‟s. Furthermore, the Commission, which has had a pro-cooperative approach and 
is the most important policy entrepreneur within our policy framework, did only agree to apply 
“flexible” budget rules. So, the gathered directions agreed upon at the summit, which took plays 
only days before the ECOFIN and Eurogroup meetings, resembles the attitude which Germany 
entered negotiations with; a non-cooperative bailout plan but a common understanding of cross-
border risks. According to Rhodes the power play between organisations within a network involves 
the exchange of resources among them. Looking at the result from the summit it seems that the 
resources held by Germany, that is political, economic and legitimacy resources, were powerful 
enough to alter the position held by the other organisations – even the Commission which normally 
highlights the importance of collaborative action. What confirmed Germany‟s position as dealing 
with the crisis in a nationally oriented manner was the announcement of their bank-package only 
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hours later, which followed the example of Ireland despite earlier critiques of the approach set forth 
by Angela Merkel.    
On the 7th of October, the Ecofin Council met the day after the preliminary Eurogroup gathering on 
the 6th. The idea was to make a joint policy as the finance ministers all agreed that the situation 
“calls for a coordinated response on the EU level” (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 4). However, the 
summit fell short of providing any extraordinary results. Instead, some modifications and small 
changes were made to deal with the banking situation: to raise the guarantee on deposits to 50,000 
EUR instead of the previous 20,000 EUR, following a proposal from the Commission to at least 
double the guarantee, and to further cooperation between states in order to avoid negative spill-over 
effects (Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2010: 4). The latter was a declaration of intent without any concrete 
plans for action. Thus, no major changes were made and a joint solution was at such not found. 
Rather, on the contrary it allowed states to form their own bank-package on limited conditions. The 
shout out to further cooperation seems like a reminder to the nations to bear in mind the concept of 
the MoU, as it provides the only cooperative framework of crisis management within the EMU.  
The results from the Ecofin Council and Eurogroup meetings on the 6 th and 7th resembles the output 
of the mini-summit in France on the 4th. Like in the case of the mini-summit, the organisations who 
met in advance favoured the approach of nation-states handling the crisis from within but they did 
call for a cooperative spirit towards the implications and potential risks, any action can have in a 
cross-border perspective. The structural relationship at the meetings the 6th and 7th favours the 
organisations participating in the mini-summit a few days earlier. This is because they posses all the 
necessary resources to create a dominant coalition in the Ecofin Council where the voting takes 
place. Therefore, the decisions look like a result on German premises. Having the power structure 
of our policy network in mind it is likely to assume that Germany was able to do this according to 
their relative power potential, which gives them the most bargaining power of the organisations 
comprising the network. This was underlined during the meetings on the 6th and 7th.  
After the meetings, president Barroso delivered on the 8th of October a speech within which he 
presented his view on the crisis and how to handle it. He stated that he was encouraged by what he 
called the determination showed by the 27 member states to work together – a dubious term since 
the agreements made up to that point, as mentioned, were somewhat wanting in substance. This was 
not neglected by Barroso who called for further engagement and willingness to do more while 
stressing the fact that it must be a unified EU who dealt with the crisis because it would be a lot 
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more difficult to overcome it as divided union (Speech by Barroso, Brussels Oct 2008 v. Europa 
press release). From this we can conclude that the Commission beforehand had wished for an 
agreement on closer cooperation within the EMU and though Barroso speaks politely about the 
Ecofin Council the Commission does not seem satisfied with the output and calls for further 
engagement.   
6.2.2.3 Decision making       
Hints of willingness to cooperate can be found in the Plan for Concerted Action agreed upon on the 
12th of October which marks the entry into the decision-making phase of the policy process. Here, 
there was an emergency summit where the Heads of States of the Euro-area countries attended. The 
agenda of the day was to take the initiatives already agreed upon to a further level and to restore 
confidence on the financial market. The meeting was a reaction to October the 6th where the 
financial markets had one of its worst days. This emergency summit is generally viewed as the 
turning point towards handling the crisis on an EU level instead of seeking single-state solutions 
(Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 2009: 13). The summit pointed out the importance of taking additional 
measures: “Further concerted actions are urgently needed (…)” (Declaration on a concerted 
European action plan of the Euro-area Countries v. Europa.eu; EUR-Lex). In particular, the 
attendants supported the proposal by the European Investment Bank (EIB16) to jointly provide 30 
billion EUR to support SME‟s17. In addition, the meeting established that governments should 
remain dedicated to provide efficient recapitalization of distressed banks to avoid further market 
distress. In doing so they supported the decision from the Ecofin meeting on October the 7 th about 
the obligation of nation-states to provide guarantees for the insolvent national banks, with a 
minimum amount equal to the 50.000 euro guarantee. Furthermore, it was proclaimed anew that 
management of the crisis should be cohesive and coordinated and that the member states therefore 
agreed on a harmonized approach aiming at:  
“ (…) ensuring appropriate liquidity conditions for financial institutions; facilitating 
the funding of banks, which is currently constrained; providing financial institut ions 
with additional capital resources so as to continue to ensure the proper financing of the 
economy: allowing for an efficient recapitalisation of distressed banks; ensuring 
sufficient flexibility in the implementation of accounting rules given current exceptional 
                                                 
16 The EIB (European Investment Bank) was designed for the financing of capital investment that would benefit EC 
(EU) development (McGowan, 2008;216) 
17 Small and Medium Enterprises 
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market circumstances; enhancing cooperation procedures among European countries.” 
(Declaration on a concerted European action plan of the Euro-area Countries, pp.2 v. 
Europa.eu; EUR-Lex)     
Moreover, the Euro-area stressed the importance of the Commission, during financial turmoil, to 
keep reacting quickly and being flexible on state aid opportunities. Even though the statement did 
not change anything constitutionally, it provided the Commission with enhanced legitimacy in the 
crisis management. Besides that, additional support to the ECB‟s decision to improve the conditions 
for providing additional funding to banks Also, the ECB and the Eurogroup were encouraged to act 
flexibly in times of crisis, which added to their role in the management of the crisis on a Euro-area 
level. The last formulated proposal on this policy was to improve monitoring of member states by 
easing the exchange of information between governments, the president of the European council, 
the president of the European Commission, the president of the ECB and the president of the 
Eurogroup (Declaration on a concerted European action plan of the Euro-area Countries, pp.2 v. 
Europa.eu; EUR-Lex). These proposals then proceeded in the policy process towards the decision 
of official approval by the European Council.  
The proposal made on the meeting on October the 12th 2008 was officially approved and signed by 
all EU nations at the meeting of the Heads of State at October the 15-16th. It is interesting to note 
that the Heads of State did not take part in the formulation phase but merely adopted the proposal 
once the Eurogroup had formulated it. As a result of this meeting the European Council affirmed 
their commitment to securing all necessary measures to avoid bankruptcies, to protect savers‟ 
deposits and to secure the financial stability, in terms of support to major financial institutions 
(Council of the European union 15-16 October 08: 2).  
6.3 Sum-up of the first policy analysis  
Thus, enhanced cooperation was heavily debated. But a specific agreement of joint crisis 
management, such as that proposed by France, was not reached. The ECB liquidity provision and 
the EIB‟s 30 billion EUR to support European SME‟s remain the only joint solutions. Otherwise, 
cooperation was restricted to information sharing, flexibility, and coordination among member 
states. On the one hand, this demonstrates the non-innovative nature of the policy process. The 
many statements about the need to improve cooperation all run along the same line as laid out in the 
MoU, with nothing really concrete or binding in any way. Several organisations proposed a tighter 
cooperative bond between member states, the clearest example hereof being France, when Sarkozy 
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proposed a joint rescue-plan. However, within the network organisations backed up by great 
amounts of resources opposed such closeness in cooperation, best exemplified by the UK and 
German resistance to the Sarkozy rescue-plan. The already existing principles regarding crisis 
management have to a great length been repeated over and over again. Nevertheless, development 
did happen, especially after the 6th of October where the gravity of the crisis became evident. This 
resulted in the Eurogroup emergency summit the 12th attended by head of states. Here the 
agreement was reached about several action plans and cooperation was taken to the next level, i.e. 
the responsibilities and importance of several EMU level institutions was reaffirmed. Consequently, 
the statements in the Barroso speech were given renewed force.      
The fourth of October meeting is of great importance both in the actual policy process and in order 
to determine the distribution of power within the network. The mini-summit was a gathering of the 
most important organisations of the network; those whose resources allow them to dominate the 
process. Despite the lack of economic resources, the Commission participated in this meeting, 
affirming its role as policy entrepreneur. Nevertheless, as mirrored in Barroso‟s statements 
throughout the policy process, the Commission heavily depends on other organisations with more 
tangible resources and consequently bargaining power. This of course means that the Commission 
is forced to take the standpoints and decisions of other organisations into consideration when 
formulating own decisions.  
In addition to the sum-up of the first policy analysis, we have provided it, on the next page, with a 
graphical design that shows the different policy stages and timeline for the main actions taken in 
each of the processes.    
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6.4 Analysis part two 
6.4.1Introduction  
Before the following analysis of the policy process preceding the adoption of Economic Adjustment 
Program for Greece, there will be an exposition of the intermediate phase between the first policy 
solution (the bank-package) and the second (the TEAP). Though this period is not actually part of 
either of the policy processes this section is included to illustrate how the policy orientation within 
the EU slowly changed thereby creating a different point of departure for the second policy process 
than the first. 
6.4.2 Intermediate phase 
The problem of the financial crisis had already been on the agenda and given a high priority 
throughout the network, the Commission communicated its report “A European Framework for 
Action” on the 29th of October 2008. Therefore, it was not so much an attempt to give this problem 
a more central place on the agenda. Rather, it was an attempt to influence the formulation of the 
policies the member states were to adopt in order to mitigate the problem, pointing them in a more 
community-oriented direction. The framework was further developed into the “European Economic 
Recovery Plan” which was presented late November 2008 proposing a joint national budgetary 
stimulus package in the area of 200 billion EUR (Commission adopts European economic recovery 
plan v. European commission). The fact that it was subsequently adopted by the European Council 
in December suggests a sense of community-orientation among European state leaders since the 
package requires coordination of national efforts. The Commission has consistently been 
advocating for a high level of coordination and cooperation in the EU‟s response to the financial 
crisis, as it was also exemplified through the first solvency-crisis. This position is fully in line with 
its interest of strengthening the EU level which reflects strong community orientation which is a 
central value to its appreciative system . In line with this it was emphasised in the report that in 
future crisis managements it would be necessary to act jointly in order to create the best response 
and that separate actions would turn out to be the absolute opposite.   
The Commission expressed willingness to provide substantial loans in cooperation with the IMF to 
those nations that experienced balance of payment pressure or serious financial-stability risks in 
Central and Eastern Europe where crisis had begun to develop (Commission report October 29 th). 
On the same day of the communication the EMU formed an aid package together with the IMF and 
the World Bank worth 20 billion EUR for Hungary. This decision succeeded that of the ECB to 
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financially support the major Hungarian Magyar Nemzeti bank. As the decision was in all 
likelihood motivated by the fact that euro-area banks had lent substantial amounts to the country 
(Hodson & Quaglia 2010: 942) it suggests the impact of economic resource dependencies. In 
addition, the ECOFIN decided to provide financial aid for Latvia worth a maximum of 3.1 billion 
EUR in January 2009 18 and later in June a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the 
European Union and Romania containing the criteria for loans of 5 billion EUR19.  
So, the EU had managed to orchestrate common support prior to adopting the policy of providing 
financial aid to Greece but these countries all set themselves apart from Greece in not being euro-
area members and hence not impeded by the no-bailout rule laid out in Article 125 of the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Another significant difference is the fact that the amounts involved in their recues were 
much smaller than that of Greece. However, behind coordinated aid to Hungary, Romania and 
Latvia must have been the idea that helping these countries was the best way to avoid problems that 
would have had negative spill-over effects in other EU member states. Keeping in mind that this 
view must have been prevalent at that point it seems puzzling that the policy process surrounding 
the debt issue of Greece was marked by inertia and resistance. Granted, Greece is a euro-area 
member and thus subject to the no bailout clause but exactly because of this membership the 
perception that default in Greece would have grave consequences for the rest of the area should be 
all the more influential.  
6.4.3 Policy Analysis of The Economic Adjustment Program to Greece 
The Economic Adjustment Programme (TEAP) for Greece is a program by the European 
Commission staff to create an overview of the challenges faced by Greece and, a complete 
adjustment programme, which involves implementing many austerity procedures; excessive 
taxation, fighting tax evasions and corruption, restructuring of pension fund and health care system 
(The economic adjustment program for Greece v. General for economic and financial affairs). 
However, this policy analysis will not be concerned with TEAP‟s objectives and how it will 
implement these. As with the first part of analysis, we are more interested in analysing the agenda 
setting, policy formulation and decision-making stage that created and formed the program as well 
as the different organisations operating within the different stages.   
                                                 
18 See: Memorandum of Understanding between The European Community and Latvia  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_operations/pdf/2009-07-20-smou-latvia_en.pdf  
19 See : European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_operations/2010-01-28-bop-romania_en.htm  
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6.4.3.1 The agenda-setting stage 
In February 2009 the problem of Greece came to the fore as a result of the Commission‟s 
assessment of the annually reported projections that each member state is required to make in its 
Stability Program. According to that of Greece the country‟s deficit would in 2009 reach 3.7 
percent of GDP – but then fall to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2011. The Stability and Growth Pact 
annexed in the Maastricht Treaty establishes that government deficits above 3 percent of GDP are 
prohibited and that compliance with this rule be ensured through the provision of statistical data to 
the Euro-stat by the member states. In the event that one of them exceeds the limit the Commission 
and the Ecofin council evaluate the financial position, on the basis of which they will decide if the 
deficit is acceptable. There can be mitigating circumstances: the deficit can be considered 
temporary if the European Commission's budget forecasts that the deficit will fall below the 3 
percent value when unusual circumstances or serious downturns have occurred tha t are outside the 
member states‟ control (Stability and Growth Pact and economic policy coordination v. EU 
legislation).  
In the case of Greece the Commission issued its recommendation to the Ecofin Council in late 
March which then followed it by establishing on the 27th of April that an excessive deficit existed in 
Greece and taking the decision to set in motion an excessive deficit procedure (Council of the 
European Union 16 February 2010). Though it was a month before the issue was formally put on 
the agenda of the ECOFIN, which indicates inertia, the Commission acted as agenda-setter. It had 
the function of a policy entrepreneur in pointing out the problem to the ECOFIN Council which 
then issued a recommendation to Greece that it was, in accordance with article 126(7) in The Treaty 
of Lisbon (The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union v European Union), to put an end 
to the excessive deficit situation by 2010 (Giving notice to Greece for deficit reduction v. European 
Commission). Furthermore, the Council set forth a deadline of the 27th of October 2009 before 
which the Greek authorities had to provide data establishing that they had taken  
“effective actions to strengthen the fiscal consolidation path and to specify the measures 
that seem sufficient to ensure adequate progress towards the correction of the excessive 
deficit by 2010.” (Giving notice to Greece for deficit reduction v. European 
Commission) 
Thus, the problem was acknowledged but it was a while before it gained a prominent place on the 
agenda. Contributing to this delay was the fact that the ongoing crisis undermined the issue of the 
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Greek deficit. That each member state struggled to shelter itself from setbacks resulting from the 
financial crisis had the effect of lessening attentiveness to the Commission in this aspect (EU 
Observer 17 February 2009). Greece‟s breach of the 3 percent rule was simply overshadowed by 
national problems owing to the financial crisis which were perceived as more urgent. Moreover, 
Greece was in competition with other problems as excessive deficits were established at the same 
time in Ireland, Spain and even France which coupled with the relatively modest size of the 
deviation lessened the sense of urgency. Also, Greece exceeding the limit was by no means unusual. 
Since making their decision to join the Euro-area in December 2000 Greece has never really been 
able to go under the 3 per cent deficit of their GDP, which has been due to systematic overspending 
on the government sector. The expenditures of the government grew from 44 percent of GDP in 
2000 to over 50 percent in 2009 and have ended in a gross government debt that reached 115 
percent of GDP, of which most of the external debt payment has been in the unreformed health care 
system and public sector (The economic adjustment program for Greece v. General for economic and financial 
affairs).  
Greece gradually gained a more central position on the agenda as it turned out that its situation was 
far worse than initially assumed. The two sets of excessive deficit procedure notifications 
transmitted to Eurostat20 in the fall of 2009 made the Greek deficit stand out. In the first set from the 
2nd of October the Greek government gave a report indicating, as it had months earlier in April, that 
the budget deficit for 2008 was 5 percent of GDP (Jones 2010: 35) and showing projections for 
2009 according to which it was to decline to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2009. But after taking office 
George Papandreou‟s new government revised these figures and publicly revealed the second set of 
data on the 21st. The first interesting correction made by the new government was that the stated 
deficit of 2008 changed from 5 percent of GDP to 7.7 percent of GDP. Still more significant was 
the fact that the Greek government revised the deficit ratio for 2009 from 3.7% of GDP to 12.5% of 
GDP (Report on Greek Government deficit and debt statistics, COM 2010, 1, final).  
That the deficit was thus suddenly announced to be more than four times the limit laid down in the 
Stability and Growth Pact made it a central problem. Therefore, the change of government in 
Greece in early October can be considered a change in the political stream. The vast deficit was part 
of the problem stream from which policy entrepreneurs choose issues to be put on the agenda. It 
was then the conjuncture of these two streams that made it possible for the deficit problem to gain 
                                                 
20 A body under the Commission responsible for the gathering and handling of statistical data  
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such prominence. On this background Papandreou‟s government can be said to have had the 
function of a policy entrepreneur. Giving it this label does not indicate, however, as the term would 
usually suggest, that the austerity measures it has adopted to mitigate the problem are policy 
changes for which they have just been waiting for a window of opportunity to open. Rather, they are 
adopted purely out of necessity despite vehement popular opposition. Granted, the Commission was 
agenda setter as it was the first organisation in the network to put the problem on the agenda but it 
was the Greek government that gave it its status as crucial by providing information that projected it 
as much graver. This is only possible because of the high level of economic interdependencies 
between Greece and other Euro-area members. Otherwise, the issue of a potential Greek default 
would be a matter of little concern to these other states.  
An organisation that would be greatly affected by such an occurrence was Germany since German 
banks have given big-scale loans to Greece (Jones, 2010: 32). Specifically, the exposure of German 
and French banks to Greece amounted to 88 billion EUR (if one adds the exposure to Portugal, 
Ireland and Spain the figure rises to 660 billion EUR) (Wall Exposure to Greese Weighs on 
Freanch, German banks v. Wall Street Journal 2010). Despite economic interdependency and the 
potential negative effects on German banks the country was hesitant to provide financial assistance 
to Greece. Upon learning that the Greek deficit figures submitted on the 2nd of October were grossly 
incorrect Merkel publicly announced that “Germany would not be providing any direct assistance” 
(Jones, 2010: 21). Having established that Germany is the most powerful organisation economically 
and thus politically (due to the subject of the area) within the network, it is interesting to ask for 
which reasons the German organisation took this stance. According to Rhodes, in this initial phase 
where the problem is on the agenda but the exact configuration o f the policy is still lacking, each 
organisation will seek power advantages. It could seem that this is exactly what Germany is doing. 
By showing reluctance and a laid-back attitude in this horizontally constructed network, Germany 
forces other organisations that are resource interdependent with Greece to get involved. A reason 
for this is likely to be that Germany is not ignorant of its own status as the most economically 
resourceful organisation and that in any coordinated aid to Greece Germany would therefore bear 
the greatest economic costs. Furthermore, in rejecting the possibility of Germany giving financial 
support they set the tone for the later stage of the policy cycle namely that of the policy formulation. 
Had Germany immediately signalled willingness to provide direct assistance they would not have 
had as strong a position to make demands.  Without German reluctance, it would not be necessary 
for the organisations that advocated for provision of financial aid to give in to German demands in 
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order for the policy to proceed in the process. Therefore, the German approach increased 
Germany‟s prospects for dominating the process.  
Concerns over such power advantages could be a possible explanation as to why the deficit figures 
were manipulated. Revealing more realistic values would impede its pursuit of power advantages 
since it would mean making clear that Greece is much more dependent on the organisations of the 
network of the Euro-area. Due to Greece‟s situation this pursuit is more defensive than offensive in 
character so to speak. In this vein these actions were a product of a wish to avoid weakening its 
position vis-à-vis the network. This does not neglect the very probable influence of electoral 
concerns. Parliamentary elections took place in Greece on the 4th of October and the potential 
damage of revealing the much bleaker projections only two days prior to that, probably have a 
greater impact than concerns over position in the Euro-area. Nevertheless, from the policy network 
theory perspective, exposing the real seriousness of the situation in Greece also means exposing a 
much greater need for economic resources, then weakening Greece‟s position in its relation with the 
network  
Motivations aside, the alterations of the figures caused doubt as to the accuracy of the Greek data 
provided under the excessive deficit procedure, which added to the perceived seriousness of the 
problem through speculations of whether the deficits could be even greater. Therefore, the ECOFIN 
Council invited the Commission in mid November to deliver a report investigating and mitigating 
the problems of Greece‟s fiscal statistics. This resolved in a recommendation made by EU 
Commission to the Ecofin Council that Greece had not made the necessary actions to lower the 
deficit of the GDP to 3 percent. It was stated that the  
“strong deterioration in Greece‟s budgetary position (…) can only partly be attributed 
to the macroeconomic conditions and, hence, are mainly due to an insufficient response 
by the Greek authorities to the Council recommendation according to Article 104(7) of 
the Treaty of 27 April 2009”. (Establishing whether effective action has been taken by 
Greece v. European Council) 
Failure to comply with the recommendations impeded the process towards a policy of provid ing 
financial assistance to Greece since the provision of economic resources by the network to Greece 
would not come without demands. The Commission delivered the report on the 8 th of January 2010 
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(Report on Greek government deficit and debt crisis v. European Commission) which should be 
seen in the context of article 126(9) of The Treaty of Lisbon, which states:  
“If a Member State persists in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the 
Council, the Council may decide to give notice to the Member State to take, within a 
specified time limit, measures for the deficit reduction which is judged necessary by the 
Council in order to remedy the situation.” (Report on Greek government deficit and 
debt crisis v. European Commission) 
According to the report the flaws in the statistical data were due to methodological weaknesses and 
unsatisfactory technical procedures as well as lack of cooperation and inappropriate governance 
between several Greek institutions (Report on Greek Government deficit and debt statistics, COM 
2010, 1, final). With reference to these problems the Commission argued that Eurostat was indeed 
given wrong information of the fiscal and financial situation in Greece because the independent 
Greek statistical institute NSSG was given, to some extent, irregular data from Ministry of Finance 
and national statistic services. Furthermore, the report revealed that the excessive deficit procedure 
notifications submitted by the Greek authorities on the 2nd of April, the 2nd of October and the 21st 
of October 2009 showed signs of modification of figures and incorrect alterations of several 
revenues and expenditures. In addition, it led to allegations that Greece used complex financial 
products from investment banks in the US, to conceal its real deficit. Thus, the Commission‟s report 
gave the impression that data coming from the Greek government was deeply unreliable, adding to 
already existing sentiments that were built up in October. It led to the view that the problem posed 
by Greece‟s deficit was of a graver nature still, thereby contributing further to the sense of urgency.  
Delivering the report, as requested, to the ECOFIN Council is an example of the agenda setter 
influencing policy-makers to acknowledge the seriousness of the issue. Upon taking up the report at 
an ECOFIN meeting in January the Council stated that it  
 “(…) must be addressed as a matter of priority, as they are fundamental for the 
economic policy surveillance process of the EU and EMU” (Council Meeting 2990th v. 
European Council 19 January 2010).  
Therefore, they invited the Commission in cooperation with the Greek authorities to propose and 
develop an action plan by February 2010, which was to include measures that would resolve the 
statistical problems identified (Council Meeting 2990th v. European Council 19 January 2010). 
63 
 
Therefore this is an example of the Commission exercising influence and power at the formulation 
stage as well. But this was only done following the decision of the ECOFIN Council and they do 
not themselves possess decision-making powers.   
By bringing attention to the statistical problems of Greece the Commission also presented the 
deficit problem as more pressing. The recommendation for the Council issued by the Commission 
on the 3rd of February had the same effect since it proposed a postponement of the previous 
deadline Greece had to bring its budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP to 2012. In other words, it 
was argued that the problem could not be solved as quickly as hoped:  
“The structural deficit in 2009 stands at 11½% of GDP. Therefore the total structural 
adjustment necessary for Greece, to bring the headline deficit below the reference value 
of 3% of GDP is more than 9% points of GDP. Therefore, a correction of the excessive 
deficit in 2010, as previously recommended by the Council is no longer realistic.” 
(Giving notice to Greece for deficit reduction, pp.18 v. European Commission) 
Furthermore, the recommendation set out that the Greek government timely implement a reform 
programme that take into account the general interest of the euro area and of the European Union as 
a whole (Commission recommendations for Greece, 2 February 2010). These recommendations are 
not as such a part of the final Greece help-package, but they are important to note since they 
affected and changed the policy-climate in which the final policy of helping Greece took place, 
impacting the formulation stage. Elaborately they concerned a reform to increase the effectiveness 
of the public administration, pension and healthcare system and maintaining stability in the banking 
and financial sector (Giving notice to Greece for deficit reduction, pp.18 v. European Commission). 
As we outlined in the definition of the policy network the Commission primarily possesses agenda-
setting powers. However, as stated in the illumination of the rules of the game the Commissioner 
for Economic and Monetary Affairs is in contact with a wide variety of organisations in the policy 
network before putting problems on the agenda. That is the otherwise politica lly independent ECB, 
the ECFIN as well as the Euro-group whose meetings the Commissioner participates in. Therefore, 
one could reasonably assume that the proposed reforms are a result of an alignment of interests. In 
order for such reforms to be adopted, however, The Commission is dependent on the ECOFIN 
Council due to their political resources in the form of its decision-making powers.  
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In an article by the Wall Street Journal, Stephen Jen of Bluegold Capital Management (Why 
concern for Greece Wasn‟t just a singular worry v. Wall Street Journal) claimed that the European 
countries could not let Greece handle the deficit crisis alone or leave the matter to the mechanism of 
the financial market – as was done in the first case of banking crisis. He underlines the importance 
of resource interdependencies when stating that the linkages between European banks systems and 
loans are a potentially potent transmission mechanism, which would have made it hard to put a 
fence around the Greek sovereign crisis. Such notions impacted the European Council summit on 
the 11th of February 2010. It resulted in a common statement where it was emphasised that all Euro-
area members would take determined and coordinated action to safeguard the financial stability in 
the Euro-area. In other words, it meant that all Euro-area states agreed to take action if Greece 
should find itself in trouble. The common statement did not, however, promise any form of 
financial aid (Statement by the Heads of state v. European Council). It was a declaration of intent 
but rid of specific plans for action. 
After this meeting Sarkozy and Merkel gave a joint press conference. This reflects that it is 
precisely the organisations that these two represent that hold the greatest resources in this policy 
process – the organisations do not hold the same level of resources in every process. Sarkozy said 
nothing of the details of the agreement but stated that Europe was committed to showing solidarity 
with Greece drawing attention to efforts of the Greek government to decrease the budget deficit as 
justification for financial aid (EU leaders withhold details of Greece rescue plan v. Euractive,). 
Merkel, on the other hand, displayed some reluctance in saying that: 
 "Greece is a part of the European Union and won't be left on its own, but there are 
rules and these rules need to be adhered to." (EU leaders withhold details of Greece 
rescue plan v. Euractive,).  
This is an example of German articulation of its demands, indicating that any financial aid would 
hinge on the fulfilment of demands of austerity and cuts from the Greek government. Thereby 
Germany implicitly emphasises that in no form for support would free-riding be allowed and that 
Germany would not be acting as a safety-net. This stance reflects the above mentioned German 
awareness of its position as the greatest holder of economic resources in the network. This status 
has led to a German anxiety about the risk of Germany becoming responsible for paying for the 
vices of other Euro-area countries. As a result, compliance with the rules, in this case those of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, has become a profound value in the appreciative system of Germany. 
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France argues for helping Greece on the grounds of solidarity. Nevertheless, within this arena 
France and Germany seem to be approaching each other. This development was critical in the 
policy process since That they began to approach each other was paramount because these 
organisations are the two biggest economies within the network. They are among the four who hold 
the greatest number of votes in the ECOFIN and thus possess the highest amounts of political 
resources. Adding to their powers are also legitimacy resources stemming from the status of 
Germany and France as having been the main axis of the EMU cooperation.  
As the above shows Germany and France held different views on how best to proceed. France as an 
organisation possesses substantial legitimacy resources while being, as mentioned, economically 
interdependent with Greece. Having established that Germany set a tone in this agenda setting 
stage, it is interesting to analyse what position France holds before policy formulation. As the 
declaration of solidarity in February 2010 indirectly shows Sarkozy acknowledged the economic 
interdependency between the network and Greece. Another much more literate example of this is 
the following quote from March 2010:  
“This problem could hit lots of countries if we don't come up with a collective response"  
(Euro zone aid for Greece comes one step closer v. Euractive).  
In this phase of the policy process, prior to concrete policy formulation, France uses their influence 
capabilities to stress the importance of collective action. This is arguably done in an attempt to bias 
the forthcoming policy formulation. These different strands of thinking mirror the historic 
differences between Germany and France throughout the creation of the Euro quite well. As stated 
previously France has from the beginning stressed the importance of solidarity and cohesion in the 
economic cooperation. Germany on the other hand valued the freedom of the individual nation-state 
highly (See; 5.5).     
6.4.3.2 Formulation and decision-making 
The Ministers of the Eurogroup and the ECOFIN Council met on the 15 th and 16th of February to 
adopt the recommendations communicated, as previously mentioned, by the Commission in the 
beginning of February 2010. Once the recommendations have thus been adopted, Greece as a 
member of the Stability Pact 2010, is required to follow these recommended adjustments. The four 
main goals decided by the Ecofin Council are as follows: Firstly, the Council gave a notice to 
Greece to bring its deficit below 3 percent by 2012. Secondly, Greece was to set out a timetable of 
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measures to be taken and include measurements to target the deficit of the current 12.7 percent to an 
estimated 8.7 percent of GDP by the end of 2010. Thirdly, that Greece had to report by the 16th of 
March, the first series of measures taken. Finally, in context to this first report to be delivered in 
March, Greece was also to announce additional measures to ensure that the 2010 budgetary target 
was met (Council gives notice to Greece to correct its government deficit by 2012 v. European 
Council).   
These recommendations were the first tiny steps preceding the larger Adjustment program (i.e. 
TEAP) and Greece was therefore recommended to implement further adjustments measures of a 
more permanent nature. In addition to the austerity measures to be implemented, the Greek Prime 
minister went to Germany in the beginning of March to meet with Angela Merkel to ask for 
Germany‟s financial support. By doing so, prime minister Papandreou emphasised the Greek 
resource dependency on Germany thereby enhancing the power advantages of the German 
organisation. This serves as further testimony to Germany being the most resourceful organisation 
in the network. Papandreou did not ask for direct financial aid but for support that would enable 
Greece to borrow money at reasonable terms on the financial market. In this context, many banks 
and investment banks considered loans to Greece to be high risk loans due to its financial situation 
and without the support of European countries the terms of these loans or bonds would be very 
expensive:  
“ (…) a €5 billion 10-year syndicated bond was more than three times oversubscribed 
at a price of about 6.4 percent – twice what Berlin pays, banking”(Greece draws strong 
bond demand at high price v. Business spectator) 
It was estimated that Greece needed to borrow 53 billion euro in 2010 and at least 20 billion before 
May. One would think that this deadline would speed up the policy process due to the 
interdependency of the organisations. However, Germany made clear in the beginning of March 
that no promise for financial aid was on the table (Greek PM to seek support from Germany v. 
Business Spectator). In addition, Merkel clearly stated that Greece must solve its own problems and 
that it was not up to German taxpayers to bail out Greece. This was a view widely s hared in the 
German population. Reluctance to pay for what was seen to be Greek overspending and festive 
years was prevalent (Greece draws strong bond demand at high price v. Business spectator). It is 
quite probable that the impact of such sentiments were all the greater since Merkel was facing an 
important election in the most populous state in Germany due to take place in early May 2010. 
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Moreover, Merkel could face a legal challenge by German law if she agreed to aid Greece (Europe 
agrees on Greek safety net with IMF role v. Reuters). Nevertheless, despite the fact that popular 
opposition constituted a considerable barrier, Germany did eventually soften its pos ition.   
This could be due to the fact that Greece showed clear signs of having implemented nume rous 
austerity measures in March. Following these efforts the Ecofin Council met on the 16th of that 
month to consider the measures taken by Greece. An assessment of these was made by the 
Commission, in cooperation with experts from the IMF. The Ecofin welcomed the communication 
and concluded that the Greek government had made the necessary measurements to correct its 
deficit and that they where appropriately implemented. Further measurements were to be 
implemented if the 2010 target to lower the Greek deficit to 8, 7 percent of GDP (Economic and 
Financial affairs v. European Council). In addition, it was noted that the Greek government had not 
asked for financial aid only for a promised support if it should turn out they could not borrow 
enough money at reasonable terms.   
Such support would not constitute a bailout Barroso was keen to emphasise in an interview with 
Financial Times from the 23rd of March. An incentive for that statement is that a bailout would be a 
breach of Article 125 in the Treaty of Maastricht. This legal barrier, which was also at work during 
the first policy process concerning banking crisis, had, however, been lessened to some degree with 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009 as the new Treaty provided the 
organisations of the network with the opportunity to circumvent the no bailout clause. Therefore, it 
constitutes a significant change of the rules of the game 21 that article 122 allows for the Council, on 
the basis of a recommendation from the Commission, to decide upon giving financial support to a 
member state provided that this state  
“(…) is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by 
natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control (…)” (The Lisbon 
Treaty article 122 v. Lisbon treaty). 
                                                 
21 While we acknowledge this we will not be engaging in investigations of the power plays involved in the formulation  
and adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon since this would take away our focus of analysing the policy -processes and power 
plays surrounding the initial responses to banking crises and the financial aid to Greece, respectively   
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Exactly what qualifies as such ”exceptional occurrences” is unclear and including the financial 
crisis in this category can give some legally based legitimacy to a decision to aid Greece. Such 
legitimacy might be weakened, though, by arguments that the debt crisis was very far from being 
beyond the control of Greece. Such views are likely to have been a key reason for hesitation and 
reluctance within the network to help Greece. Regardless of the legal foundation, an important 
reason for projecting financial aid as anything but a bailout remained: the need to get Germany to 
agree to support. The term bailout would, as mentioned, be met by fierce German opposition.    
The European Council, following its spring meeting on the 25-26th of March 2010 reaffirmed the 
conclusion of the 16th March, that Greece had made the necessary adjustments to correct its 
excessive deficit. The most important conclusion made at this meeting was the affirmation of the 
willingness to support Greece financially, if they ask for financial backup. Thus, aid was not given 
at that point despite the fact that the gravity of the Greek problem had been acknowledged for a 
while. It seems probable that this stalling was a product of hesitation, notably from Germany. 
Proclaiming the will to activate the aid mechanism if need be can be explained by the intention of 
restoring trust in Greece on the financial market in order to enable the country to borrow the 
necessary means from there. In this context and in cooperation with the IMF all Euro-area members 
agreed on a financial safety net for Greece involving substantial IMF financing but a majority of 
Euro-area financing in the form of bilateral loans (Statement by the Heads of State 25 of March 
2010 v. European Council). French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that the Euro-area would put up 
two-thirds of the money and IMF the rest (Europe agrees on Greek safety net with IMF role v. 
Reuters). Financial support from IMF was, however, stated as a last resort that would only be put to 
use if Greece faced severe difficulties. President of the ECB Trichet and President of the Eurogroup 
Juncker were both of the opinion that involving IMF would signal a defeat for the Euro-area which 
would be projected as incapable of handling its troubles on its own. In the case of ECB this stance 
can be seen as a consequence of its appreciative system. Granted, the ECB is not, as the 
independence stated in the Treaty of Maastricht might suggest, entirely rid of concerns over 
national interest since the seats on its Executive Board are held by the most powerful states (see The 
European Central Bank; 5.4.4). But this political independence, incomplete as it may be, means that 
the ECB is one of the organisations with the strongest community orientation. Like the Commission 
therefore, its appreciative system is dominated by community oriented ideas and values which will 
materialise in their interest of serving the Union best as a whole and the wish to establish it entity as 
powerful and capable. These values are fully in line with ECB‟s argument for avoiding IMF 
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involvement. As late as mid March 2010 France also opposed the idea of involving the IMF  
(Sarkozy Opposes IMF Greek Loan, Widens German Rift v. Bloomberg). However, the 
involvement of IMF was an important objective for Germany (Merkel says EU could back Greece 
as ‟a last resort‟ v. Euractive). This reflects the continued impact of German awareness that being 
the biggest organisation in the network they would be granting the greater amount of econo mic 
resources. Sharing the burden with IMF would make the idea more acceptable. From a policy 
network theory point of view it would be an option for France to form a dominant coalition with the 
like-minded ECB and President of the Eurogroup Juncker, assuming that the position held by 
Jucker on the issue of IMF involvement was representative of the Eurogroup as an organisation.  
Obstructing such a strategy, however, is the relative distribution of resources. The expertise 
resources of ECB were at odds with the fact that neither ECB nor the Eurogroup possessed adequate 
political resources as the decision of accepting the aid mechanism including decision to involve 
IMF was taken in the European Council where none of them participates and votes. In addition, 
Germany with its superior economic resources was too critical an organisation to bypass especially 
in this policy process revolving around the issue of financial aid. 
Though Germany‟s position had changed the organisation still showed hesitation and reluctance . 
Merkel said on the first day of the European Council meeting the 25th of March that  
"If a member of the currency union were to become insolvent in the current situation, it 
would mean grave risks for all in Europe" but added that: "A good European is not 
necessarily one who offers help quickly. A good European is one that respects the 
European treaties and national rights so that the stability of the euro zone is not 
damaged," (Merkel says EU could back Greece as ‟a last resort‟ v. Euractive).  
This is a neat example of attempts to cloak national orientation with concerns for the community.  
At that point, the financial safety net did not include any concrete numbers. Nor was it agreed that 
any aid would be given to Greece. The financial safety net was a mere showing of support from the 
euro area members so that Greece could be able to borrow money at reasonable terms, but still a 
binding agreement that if Greece was unable to do so and handle their excessive deficit alone, euro 
area members would aid.  
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Steps were taken towards formulation of concrete terms for potential financial aid on the 11th of 
April. The Eurogroup agreed to commence negotiations with the Commission, ECB, IMF and the 
Greek authorities to create a programme of assistance, which would entail a full assessment of the 
exact needed financing and conditions for such a programme (Statement by President Van Rompuy 
v. European Council). Thus, a number of organisations were involved in the formulation of the 
program. It would be known as The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece (TEAP) and 
consisted of a complete policy package to restore macro-economic stability and sustainable long-
term growth in Greece. The package includes several austerity measures to be implemented 
between 2010 and 2013 and an official financing of 110 billion EUR.  
It was on the 23rd of April, while TEAP was in the making, that the Greek authorities submitted a 
request for financial assistance from the Euro-area members and IMF written in a letter to Juncker 
President of the Eurogroup, Olli Rehn European Commissioner and Trichet President of the 
European Central Bank. The fact that Greece waited until that point to request that the mechanism 
agreed upon be activated can be explained by a need for certainty that the Euro-area countries were 
indeed willing to financially support. That includes Germany. From the network‟s point of view it 
would not be beneficial for the image projected externally of the Euro-area if its organisations were 
to reject a request from Greece upon having promised to do so. But following policy network theory 
another reason could be that in return for receiving economic resources Greece would be loosing 
power advantages since it would then be subject to the conditions imposed by the organisations of 
the Euro-area network.   
In spite of such conditions the view of German Finance Minister Schaeuble was that the decision to 
support Greece would be unpopular within Germany. In the days just before the signing of TEAP 
he underlined that the money originating from domestic tax-income would not be wasted when 
helping Greece: "We are defending the stability of the euro, because Germany benefits [from the 
currency] at least as much as all the others. Help for Greece is therefore not a waste of taxpayers' 
money, but a move based on fundamental German interests." (Germany puts new conditions on aid 
to Greece v. Euractive). The first part of the statement clearly reflects the interdependency between 
network members due to shared currency. Here the self- interest of Germany coincides with the joint 
interest of the Euro-area. The second part of the quotation should be seen in the context of the 
German government‟s need to limit domestic turmoil, which was especially pressing shortly before 
the election in May. It also serves as an example that the German stance on the issue had become 
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more in line with the French, among others‟, focus on collective action. Germany‟s decision to 
partake in the provision of aid to Greece reflects community orientation though it is of a limited 
kind since the justification this action is based on national interests. The national orientation is 
evident.  
In April and May 2010 a joint European Commission, ECB and IMF mission went to Athens with 
TEAP and an 80 billion euro bilateral loan and an IMF approved 30 billion euro standby loan 
agreement should it become necessary. The Greek authorities approved TEAP and the former 
mentioned loans on the 2nd of May 2010 (The economic adjustment program for Greece v. General 
for economic and financial affairs). The technical agreement thus reached between the 
organisations was then presented to the Eurogroup, which endorsed TEAP and the 80 billion euro 
bilateral loans that the Euro-area members were to provide (Statement by the Eurogroup, 2 May 
2010 v. European Council). The Eurogroup stated as follows:  
“To support the Greek government's efforts to get its economy back on track, euro area 
Member States on 2 May pledged a three-year program total of €80 billion in bilateral 
loans. Under the conditions set out in the Eurogroup statement of 11 April, up to € 30 
billion out of this program will be made available for 2010.  Its first disbursement will 
be made by 19 May.” (Statement by the Eurogroup, 2 May 2010 v. European Council).  
The IMF board approved the 30 billion loan on the 9th of May, which then fulfilled TEAP and made 
it an official policy program to be implemented by Greece in the period of 2010-2013(The 
economic adjustment program for Greece v. General for economic and financial affairs).  
6.4.4 Sum-up of our analysis 
After hints of willingness among the euro-area countries to coordinate their responses to crisis, the 
adoption of the European Economic Recovery Plan and the provision of financial aid to three 
Eastern European countries, the problem of excessive deficit in Greece was put on the agenda in 
February 2010. It was perceived as gradually more serious due to the discovery that the deficit was 
much greater than initially assumed. The organisations in the network had opposing views on how 
to solve the problem throughout the policy process. The position held by Germany on the matter of 
financially aiding Greece in mitigating the problem was reluctant. As Germany is the most 
resourceful organisation in the Euro-area network it was paramount to the adoption of the Economic 
Adjustment Program for Greece that its position changed. Looking at the end result of the po licy 
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process it is clear that Germany used its position as the organisation possessing the highest amount 
of bargaining power to highly affect policy output. An important point for Germany was to involve 
the IMF, which ended up being a part of the policy despite opposition of both Juncker and Trichet. 
Furthermore, Merkel stated clearly that Germany would not be performing a bailout of another Euro 
area member state. Shortly after, Barrosso emphasized that helping Greece would not materialise as 
a bailout. This could be seen as Barrosso approaching Merkel due to the importance of Germany‟s 
contribution in the policy. The fact that Greece lived up to the austerity measures outlined by the 
Council furthered the likeliness of German involvement. An essential factor in the German change 
of attitude is the economic interdependency between Germany and Greece in which both countries 
are mutually dependent. First of all, the involvement of German banks in Greece constitutes 
economic interdependency. However, the matter of maintaining a stable Euro obviously represents 
another example of interdependency. France that through the policy process has shown more 
willingness to provide financial aid is also interdependent with Greece. However, whereas the final 
policy output vividly had a German hallmark it is difficult to highlight the specific French impact 
on the final output.  
In addition to the sum up of the second policy analysis we have provide it, on the following page, 
with a graphical design that shows the different policy stages and timeline for the main actions 
taken in each of the processes 
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7 Discussion 
7.1 Introduction  
Through our analysis of the two policy processes, we have reached an understanding of the two 
different types of crisis management within the network of the Euro-area. First of all, there is a 
fundamental difference between the two types of crisis. Whereas the first crisis involved national 
banks and the policy outcome concerning their survival the second crisis was about the survival of a 
nation-state with overwhelming deficits. The difference of the two crises is indeed determining for 
the possibilities of action within the network. But despite their differences in both situations it was 
the same network which had to come up with a policy to overcome the detected problems. 
Departing from our research question: How and why did the Euro-area turn from a national 
perspective to a more unified solution in crisis management? We will in the forthcoming discussion 
debate how and why we saw a shift in crisis management towards a more unified solution and how 
the organisations interacted and caused this changed.   
7.2 The point of departure for crisis management 
The two types of policies were formulated on very different background s concerning the type of 
crisis and the experiences towards handling a financial crisis. As the EMU has not experienced 
previous crisis situations of this magnitude, the policy processes entered new territory as they 
evolved.  
The first crisis was an effect of the shortage of liquidity the global market experienced; therefore 
liquidity support to financial institutions was necessary. At this point of time crisis management 
was divided between member states, therefore a joint solution was not on the agenda yet. The rapid 
integration-processes within the EMU has resulted in a lot of cross-border banks which made the 
European bank-system interdependent; the supervisory system did not follow the process leaving 
them with an outdated system, where communication between nation-states was based on the vague 
guidelines of the MoU. So when Ireland made the guarantees to national banks, even though they 
acted within the framework provided by the MoU, their action posed a threat towards the 
competitiveness of the European banks. This prompted the euro-members to engage in a process 
towards a euro- level solution.  
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The second crisis had an entirely different point of departure; dealing with crisis was no longer new 
to the network. Another factor was the type of crisis. This time the crisis was rooted not in the lack 
of liquidity but in the growing national deficit in Greece. Thus the policy process had its point of 
departure in the question of whether or not and positively how to aid Greece. This question was 
highly relevant because of the economic interdependence across member states, which had the 
effect that the network needed to take a stand. Furthermore Greece could not handle this by them 
self. As the crisis escalated, it became clear that help from outside was indeed needed – what was 
left for discussion was by whom and how. The way the network of the Euro-area decided to act 
would have considerable effects on their appearance as a Union, and consequently the trust in the 
currency.  
Common to both crises were that no formal management framework existed a priori. Whereas the 
types of crisis were different, the two policy processes did share the same network, thus involving 
the same organisations interacting within the same overall rules, which allow for comparison 
between the two policy processes. Consequently, the output of the policy depends to a large degree 
on the appreciative systems of the organisations and their bargaining power.                
7.3 How did the change of crisis management appear?  
Already during the first policy process several organisations advocated for an all-embracing policy. 
But the existing framework for crisis management seemed fit to deal with the nature of the first 
crisis as the ability and responsibility for action was situated within each member state. Though 
during the policy process the need for some level of coordination became apparent, in order to 
avoid lopsided competitiveness between member states. The level of coordination remained limited 
to information sharing and informal agreements. Thus this did not lead to a reason for constitutional 
changes or acting towards legislative directives, which made taking a step towards a more 
community oriented crisis management seem unnecessary. Contrary to this, the second crisis did 
call for a joint solution, as the existing framework for crisis management could not cope with the 
challenge of a member state suffering under excessive debt and insolvency. The strength of the 
resource interdependency made it necessary to deal with the challenge as a community; therefore 
the perception of crisis management changed making a shift in the level of cooperation possible and 
desirable.    
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7.4 The point of departure for the organisations  
Due to their different historical backgrounds and structures the organisations entered the two policy 
processes with different ideas and wishes. The Commission as well as the ECB entered the two 
crises with similar approaches, as they advocated for unified action taking in both crisis. In the first 
crisis the Commission acted as policy entrepreneur, and its bargaining power was positioned within 
the agenda setting phase and the beginning of the formulation phase due to the Commission 
bringing forward the proposal of a policy. But as it did not have any voting capability its powers 
more or less diminished hereafter. Even though the ECB did not actively participate in forming the 
policies, it acted as a crucial part of the agenda setting phases since they where the first to respond 
to the crisis when it hit Europe, with a 100 billion EUR short term financing to banks in the Euro-
area. The relatively fast reaction showed vigour and was possible because of the highly isolated 
nature of the ECB. At the same time though, this decision was restricted to the financial sector. 
Even though the action was followed by a recommendation of joint action towards the crisis the 
other organisations in the network did not follow suit despite ECB‟s recognised  expertise and 
knowledge within this area.  
As for the second crisis situation, the ECB played no prominent role, though the president Trichet 
was present at meetings of organisations e.g. the Ecofin Council, at which the ECB advocated for 
cohesive actions and the non- involvement from the IMF. The role of policy entrepreneur by the 
Commission in this second crisis was even more prominent than in the first as a result of its job as 
watchdog, and due to the Commission moulding the initial cast of the TEAP. Therefore, even 
though they again did posses neither voting nor decisive powers, their influencing power over the 
shape of the policy was relatively high, despite their bargaining power being severely limited in the 
following stages. Consequently the Commission‟s real bargaining power lies in its position as 
constitutional agenda setter, especially since the Commission is the sole organisation possessing 
this specialisation. Analysing its actions towards the two policy processes it becomes vivid that the 
interest of the Commission lies in the creation of a more tightly cooperative Union – which must be 
reflections of its appreciative system. Because of the determined rules of the game existing within 
the network the Commission repeatedly operated in order to create coherence between the other 
organisations. To do so, the Commission must incorporate the interests of others, though this may 
mean undermining the Commission‟s own interests. Thereby it looses power advantages. As the 
analysis of the first policy process shows, the Commission was unsuccessful in influencing the 
Euro-area member states to engage in the desired level of cooperation. However, in the second 
77 
 
policy process the Commission played a significant role in the formulation of TEAP as it partook in 
the joint mission to Greece with the purpose of creating the concrete measures. So did ECB which 
was therefore also able to exercise significant influence in the formulation stage due to its 
substantial resources of expertise which shows that the ECB is not always primarily tied to the 
agenda setting phase. Additionally, it is quite peculiar that the ECB possesses so much power 
concerning the stability of the Euro, considering that their power is fairly restricted by other 
organisations of the network when it comes to the overall economic stability of the Euro-area. In 
this light it becomes clear that the fiscal policies within the Euro-area are solemnly anchored in the 
policy preferences of the Euro-area members. Furthermore, when it concerns policy formulation 
within the EMU, the Commission appears to be willing to bend so that coherence is created 
between the preferences of the Euro-area members. This means that the Commission operates as a 
mediator between the organisations of the network.  
Unlike this EU based-organisation the Ecofin Council and the European Council22 both posses 
decisive powers in the final stages of both policy processes. But as the content of the policy is for 
the most part determined in earlier stages, their level of influence is relatively modest. This goes 
especially for the European Council. The Ecofin Council is notably more involved, but as 
mentioned in the Exposition of the network Euro-group meetings precede all Ecofin meetings. Thus 
it is reasonable to assume, having our analysis in mind that agreement was reached on the 
preliminary Eurogroup meeting. In the first crisis Eurogroup and Ecofin meetings followed the 
actual turning point in the first policy process; the mini-summit the 4th of October 2008. The 
Eurogroup president Junker attended this mini-summit along with France and Germany. As the 
result of the Ecofin meeting bear high resemblance with what was agreed upon unofficially at the 
summit is seems likely to conclude, firstly that the Eurogroup internally agreed upon following the 
path laid out at the mini-summit and secondly that the Eurogroup had the bargaining power to get 
this accepted in the Ecofin Council, demonstrating the power relation between the Eurogroup and 
the Ecofin Council. In the second crisis concerning the aid-package to Greece the Ecofin Council 
but most importantly the Eurogroup was involved all through the formulation and decision-making 
phase. Assuming that the Eurogroup president Junker speaks on behalf of the entire group, and thus 
perceiving it as one organisation, we can extract from our analysis that they wanted the aid-package 
to be entirely European – to prove the strength of the Euro-area. Thus based on the statements made 
                                                 
22
 In the first crisis the European Council d id not yet exist, but the policy was decided upon on a meeting of head of 
states, the equivalent of the European Council before its creation with the treaty of Lisbon.    
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by Junker the interests of the Eurogroup are anchored in a community oriented appreciative system, 
despite their intergovernmental structure. Having established the bargaining power and resources of 
the various EU-bound institutions the following will elaborate on the organisations France and 
Germany. Throughout both policy processes, these two nation-states were very influential.  
French interests, reflecting the factual reality and its appreciative system, are community oriented in 
the calling for solidarity. This was to a high degree neglected or changed during the policy 
processes. In both crisis they entered the policy cycle with one attitude and departed from it with 
another. This is most clearly viewed in the first crisis where they before the meeting on the 4 th of 
October 2008 called for a joint solution to the banking crisis, and even proposed 300 billion joint 
action plan. But in the end of the summit they ended up supporting a nationally oriented policy 
throughout the decision-making. However also in the second crisis they entered the formulation and 
decision-making stage with an objective of avoiding including the IMF in the policy solution thus 
keeping the policy strictly within the EMU which emphasises their community orientation. This did 
not happen despite them sharing this opinion with the ECB and the president of the Euro-group.  
In both situations, the alteration of France‟s stand seems to be a result of German persistence. The 
first analysis showed how Germany in alliance with UK managed to alter the position of France, 
and consequently these organisations ended up constituting what best could be described as a 
dominant coalition, determining the level of supranational cooperation in the policy outcome. The 
second crisis situation suggested once again that German persistence to include IMF in the policy 
paid of despite Germany being numerically outnumbered with a majority of organisations in the 
network being against it. The processes of both policies vividly underline the strength of German 
bargaining power. This regards their economic strength and their high influence on established EU 
institutions. Consequently the resources this amounts to, certifies that Germany can easily be 
regarded as a dominant organisation due to its relative resource superiority. Thus though German 
support may not necessarily be the sole determent for policy outcome, it has at least proven to be 
crucial for the opportunity of creating a community orientated policy outcome and the level hereof.   
Departing from the above, we acknowledge that Germany plays a crucial role in determining the 
outcome of the policy. This indicates that it was a change in German interest that altered the policy 
outcome of the second crisis towards more community orientation. The appreciative system of 
Germany remains the same, i.e. in both crises it reflects a fear of becoming the money-provider of 
the Euro-area, and a wish to maintain its position as a regional superpower. This is evident in their 
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interest that crisis management should be dealt with on a national level. In the first policy process 
their interest materialised itself in an undermining of the desires of France, the Commission, the 
ECB and the Eurogroup in their cry out for a joint solution. Concerning the second crisis once again 
Germany‟s interests dominated the policy process, first by impeding a bailout and finally by solely 
wishing and consequently leading the way for the inclusion of the IMF in the Greece help package. 
There was a change, though, in German interests but it did not seem to stem from a transformation 
in its appreciative system. Rather it was a result of the different nature of the two crises. The 
economic interdependence caused Germany to gradually move from their initial standpoint; 
refusing to provide financial support to Greece, to agreeing to do exactly that. This move represents 
at the same time a move from strictly national orientation towards a more community orientated 
solution. However, within Germany the argumentation for providing support was based on national 
interests. As a result of the economic interdependence, what is community on the surface oriented is 
at the same time an action representing genuinely German interests. Therefore, the mentioned 
change should, though without neglecting the joint nature of the policy, be seen as a result of its 
dependency on the economic benefits the Euro-cooperation brings and not as a sign of solidarity.   
Through the analysis of the two policy processes we have revealed the underlying mechanisms 
which have exercised great influence over the interactions of the organisations. This has proved to 
be highly determining for the policy output. The output of the second policy is more community 
oriented and by comparing the process within the first and the second policy processes a picture 
arose of how and why a change occurred.   
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8 Conclusion 
When investigating how the change towards a more community oriented crisis management 
happened, the entry of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Intermediate phase both held significance for 
the slight alteration of the rules of the game applying to the network. In addition, there was a change 
in German interest due to the different type of crisis in the second policy process and the fact that 
the policy was made on their premises. Combined, these factors resulted in the second policy output 
becoming more community oriented compared to the first. The internal resource relationship, on the 
other hand, remained the same throughout both crises. Thus, the reason why the second crisis turned 
out to be community oriented can be found almost entirely within the German organisation. 
Between the Euro-area member states a growing interdependence has developed, which was more 
vivid in the debt crisis than in the liquidity crisis. Therefore, the need to cooperate became more 
profound. The urgency for cooperation was further enhanced by the risks of a possible state 
bankruptcy and the negative spill-over to the rest of the Euro-area. The other organisations within 
the Euro-area have throughout both cases of crisis management been advocating for more 
cooperation while Germany stood steep on the other side, reluctant to loose sovereignty and feared 
for becoming the area‟s economic safety net. The turning point for Germany was the severe effects 
a bankruptcy of Greece would have on their own economy. Thus, the ability to change the 
cooperative spirit of the policies was mainly based on the German change of interest and made 
possible by the legislative and constitutional changes through the Treaty of Lisbon. We can thus 
conclude that the answer to how and why the Euro-area turned from a national perspective to a 
more unified solution in their crisis management must be found within the German organisation.      
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9 Further discussion and perspectives 
Having analysed the Euro-area crisis management from 2008-2010 it is obvious that the framework 
surrounding the network was not prepared for dealing with crisis. Whereas the first liquidity crisis 
could be solved at an individual nation-state level, the comprehensiveness of the domestic problems 
in Greece forced the EU to come up with a joint solution. Therefore this situation looks like EMU‟s 
teenage challenge, where a member of the EMU has practised overspending and poor governance 
which severely threatens the entire cooperation. Austerity measures were forced upon Greece 
which, speaking in symbolic terms, made the Euro-area represent the adult trying to get the child to 
behave. An interesting element is that the Euro-area seemed divided in the approach to carry Greece 
out of the crisis. This is exemplified first of all by German opposition to help Greece in a crisis they 
considered to be self- inflicted and the Commission continuously calling for cohesive action. In the 
aftermath of the two crises it seems that Euro-area members find the current framework for crisis-
management inadequate.  
This is expressed in the EU-meeting in mid December 2010, where the Euro-area members have 
stressed the need for institutional change concerning financial crisis management. The object of the 
meeting is to make legislative changes of the Lisbon Treaty so it will be legally possible to bail out 
nations in crisis, equal to the situation in Greece. These extra couple of lines, which is proposed to 
be added to the Lisbon Treaty, is expected to be accepted by the heads of state. This possible 
change will help to provide a permanent measure for dealing with financial crisis instead of the 
previous inadequate ad hoc measures (Berlingske Tidende: Ny ændring af Euro-traktat uden 
folkeafstemning). The Euro-area call for permanent measures is an indirect criticism of the 
numerous ad hoc policy solutions from 2008-2010. It seems that what they call for is a thorough 
change of the rules of the game. The inclusion of the article 122 in the Treaty, which was the first 
change of the possibilities of action, was apparently not sufficient. At the mentioned summit further 
proposals to increase the level of unity in the EMU and enhance financial stability will be made. For 
instance, most of the Euro-members will advocate for an establishment of common Euro bonds, as 
well as for providing further liquidity measures to the fund for support to nations that struggle with 
national deficits. Though it is unlikely that these proposals will be realised, as both Germany and 
France will oppose. Germany believes it would undermine the incentive to be financial responsible 
and that they, as the strongest economy in the Union, would take the position as safety net. 
However, they are expected to sign the expansion of the Lisbon Treaty, so a bailout of other 
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member states would be possible and would not violate the German national constitution, as the 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel feared it would when helping Greece. Furthermore, Germany 
could also endorse a proposal from ECB president Trichet for further funds to purchase state-bonds 
in for example Spain to give them the best possible conditions for loans on the financial market.  
If further community orientation within the Euro-area is reached it could enhance the position of the 
EU on a global scale, making the EMU a politically powerful institution – at least more powerful 
than if each of the members of the network strives at gaining individual goals. In the future this 
would mean that the political skills, knowledge and expertise within the EMU could be used to 
consult nations worldwide, which constitutes a way for the EMU to obtain political legitimacy on a 
global scale. In addition, when looking at the worldwide political structure, there are some 
indications that the unipolar era, a time of unprecedented American dominion, is coming to an end 
(Financial Times: What follows American Dominion). These indications are not showing that the 
US has grown weaker but rather that other nations or entities have grown stronger and are now 
competing for political power. Though this might imply that other nations are rising to take 
America‟s place, it is more likely to imply an emergence of non-polarity. A non-polar world where, 
due to globalisation and the increasingly widely distributed power among the excessive number of 
actors on the global stage, there is no supreme concentration of power (Financial Times: What 
follows American Dominion). It was actually this perspective of a non-polar world that evoked our 
first interest to focus on the EU and whether the EU could be a political player in this non-polar 
world, post the financial crisis.  
As the EMU showed, they were able to come up with a plan to deal with Greek‟s excessive debt 
crisis. This was done through political communication across 16 borders (at least ideally. In 
practice, as established in the analysis, the communication was primarily among organisations 
possessing high amounts of resources). The political knowledge gained from such a complex 
political procedure within such a unique polity could make the EU the pioneer for other cross-
border integration projects. Hereby it can act as a political power optimally solving and 
counteracting the causalities and risks of the developing global order which encompasses several 
cross-border unions, though none as deeply integrated as the EU. The EU could in this respect act 
as a community striving at being the world‟s fire fighter and not as the former superpower the US 
the world‟s policeman.  
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For the EU to gain such a status they must act as a community. In analysing the two policy 
processes in this project, we stumbled upon a more social or „sense of belonging‟ problem. It seems 
that actors at the political and institutional level of the 27 nations within the EU have a sense of 
belonging or commitment to the Union. But the citizens of these nations seem to advert from such 
sentiments. As we unravelled the policy processes to find empirical data for our analysis, we found 
many articles and statements from German citizens in particular that during the crisis they felt that 
Greece should be left to the mercy of the market, which would eventually lead to bankruptcy. In 
addition, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel was accused of breaking the constitutional 
amendments in the German constitution when approving the loan to Greece. Furthermore, there 
were demonstrations in Germany due to fierce reluctance to approve the loan to Greece. This is 
interesting for the future of the EU community and for the matter of whether the public within the 
EU is left out of integration processes so that the integration of the EU as community only extends 
to the institutional and political level.  
If the EU wants to play a major role in the political power sphere in the late modern society, we see 
two important problems, which need to be solved. Firstly, EU has to integrate the feeling of 
belonging and commitments to the public sphere of the 27 nations, to insure that the community to 
ensure future unity. Secondly, if the EU wants to be a political superpower it has to ensure that it is 
capable of solving international problems as a union and not as 27 separate states. For example the 
EU could, as the largest economy in the world, pressure the USA, China and other key states on the 
issue environmental problems at COP-meetings to implement the same austerity measures as the 
EU is doing with the 2020 goals.  
According to the previous, the network of the Euro-area desires to become increasingly community-
oriented exemplified in the agenda of the meeting in mid December 2010. The incentives for 
increasing cooperation can be numerous; the desire of becoming a global actor, the object of 
becoming a trustworthy cross-border union which has the support of the populations of its member 
states or simply to be able to solve future financial crises more smoothly. In time of writing the 
above mentioned summit is progressing, and with the, assumed, extension of the Lisbon Treaty the 
cooperative level will increase, but not significantly. Nevertheless to take the EMU-cooperation to 
the next level and make the EMU competitiveness increase on a global level, a more devoted 
Germany is necessary. No matter what the incentives, it seems that the experiences from the  
teenage challenges of the Euro-area in the form of the liquidity crisis and the Greek debt crisis have 
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altered the initial national orientation, but further engagement for the dominant organisations is a 
necessity to take the EMU to the next level.                     
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oekonomer-vil-blokere-redningspakke-til-graekenland  14.9.2010    
- The economic adjustment program for Greece v. General for economic and financial affairs, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf   
- The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union v European Union, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF  
- Council Meeting 2990
th
 v. European Council 19 January 
2010http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/NewsRoom/loadBook.aspx?target=2010&infotarget=&max=45&b
id=93&lang=EN&id=350  
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- There is no stability without solidarity v. The commissioners, interviews,  
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/news/interviews/index_en.htm  
- The Lisbon Treaty article 122 v. Lisbon treaty, Home,  http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-
treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-3-union-policies-and-internal-
actions/title-viii-economic-and-monetary-policy/chapter-1-economic-policy/390-article-122.html  
- The Economic Adjustment programme for Greece  v. European union; Economy and Finance,  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf   
- Three Top Economists Agree 2009: Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps 
are Not Taken v. Reuters; Press release, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS193520+27-Feb-
2009+BW20090227    
W) 
- Why concern for Greece Wasn’t just a singular worry v. Wall Street Journal, 
http://topics.wsj.com/person/J/stephen-jen/594    
- What follows American Dominion v. Financial Times , 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16026/what_follows_american_dominion.html  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
